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Abstract 
 
This paper examines two important factors that describe female leadership in 
Norwegian firms. First, the main determinants of having a female CEO, and, second, the 
impact a female CEO has on firm performance. In other words, the main question the 
paper raises is if women-led companies are distinguishable in any detectable and 
relevant way. I analyze the influence of women in the executive suite across different 
samples of firms (LTD, and PLC) and divided in two time periods (prior Norwegian 
gender quota 2000-2004, and post Norwegian quota 2005-2009). 
Results indicate that after the quota, the number of women in CEO positions had 
considerably increased which suggests that the reform had promoted women not only on 
the board level, but also on the CEO level. Moreover, the findings show that after the 
quota, women CEOs had become more dominant in certain industry sectors (such as 
financial and transportation sectors), obtaining higher salaries than men CEOs.  
Nevertheless, the present paper argues that having a woman CEO has a neutral 
or negative effect on the firm. There is no relevant evidence that there is a significant 
relationship between firm performance and women CEO’s characteristics. If previous 
researches such as Adler (2001) and Deszo & Ross (2008) show that female 
participation in the board of the company has a positive effect on firm performance, the 
present paper shows that not the same positive effect can be acclaimed when having a 
woman CEO.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the particular source of diversity in 
corporate governance and top management, namely, that attributable to the participation 
of women. The issue of gender diversity has been discussed both in the academic 
literature and in the popular press. Among numerous aspects connected to the issue, 
recent studies have investigated the so-called “glass ceiling effect1” that refers to 
obstacles women have to face in their way of reaching the highest levels of power in top 
management.  
The resilience of the glass ceiling can be accounted for in many ways. Whether 
the concept is highlighted as the “semi-hard glass ceiling” (Agrawal and Knoeber 2001) 
or the “ultimate glass ceiling” (Arfken at al. 2004), women feel that as further as they 
climb on the higher levels of management, the more intense they sense a sort of male 
brotherhood from which they are excluded. At the executive level, the glass ceiling 
apparently persists.  
Therefore, it is important to measure women’s participation in executive suite in 
financial terms. It is a challenge to try and commensurate the impact that women have 
both on corporate policies and on corporate finance. Not only is performance measured 
in various ways, but women’s contribution to firm performance is also quantified by 
numerous factors (experience, background, motivation, and others). Some papers 
measure firm performance by normal stock-market returns (Adams and Ferreira 2004), 
ROI (return on investment), or CAR (cumulative abnormal returns (Nygaard 2011)). 
The performance measures I used in the paper are ROA (Return on Assets), and Profit-
to-sales-ratio.  
Most companies are founded by an individual who is likely to be both the owner 
and the manager. The manager and the CEO remain in charge of their businesses as they 
grow, being responsible for their direction and their management (Cadbury 2002).  
Executives can affect firm outcomes as they can consistently influence key 
decisions in their firms. Therefore, I believe it is important to analyze the connection 
between firm performance and CEO’s characteristics and examine whether there are 
strong relationships among the factors.  
                                                 
1 The pioneering book in this area was Morrison et al.’s Breaking the Glass Ceiling. The book brought the 
term “glass ceiling” into the lexicon in 1987.  
Looking through the Glass Ceiling. Women and Power: Leadership in Norwegian Firms 
 - 6 - 
Furthermore, the paper examines the extent to which women have vanquished 
the glass ceiling by empirically analysing if there has been an increase in women’s 
representation in CEO positions, especially after the Norwegian gender quota was 
mandated in 2005. Therefore, it is important to discuss policies currently implemented 
in some countries and organizations to foster the advancement of women in business. 
Norway is one of the countries that has the most participation of women in top 
management.  
Nevertheless, the large proportion of women on the firm’s board of directors 
might be due to the quota mandated in December 2005 rather than women’s efforts to 
break the glass ceiling by their own forces. In such a situation, when women are being 
promoted just because the company has to comply with the law, then women’s strengths 
may go unrecognized and silence may lead to the obsolete belief that women bring 
nothing new to the table. Conversely, some directors may become what sociologists call 
the “Queen Bee”: they take advantage of their token status posing as the single 
representative in their collectivity as they excessively criticize their potential women 
peers (Hemingway and White 2009).  
The aim of the present paper is to extrapolate previous researches both on 
gender studies, and on the impact female members from the board of directors have on 
firm performance to a more specific aspect of female leadership. Namely, the research 
narrows down to female representation at the highest level of the firm, the CEO level.  
This paper contributes to the economic literature on gender and top management 
by attempting to find the main firm characteristics that determine the gender of the 
CEO, and which factors make a firm more likely to have a female CEO rather than a 
male CEO. Moreover, the research is expanded to the examination of the well-known 
chicken-and-egg problem – do women change their working environment after reaching 
the highest level in corporate promotion, or do women reach the top of the pyramid 
because they work in an environment that is already favourable to them? In other words, 
is firm performance dependant on the CEO gender or is the CEO gender dependent on 
firm characteristics?  
Since the mid-1980s, advocates for women have worked hard to convince the 
business world that women are as capable as men in high executive positions. 
Therefore, their inclusion in the executive suite contributes to the goodwill of the 
company (Adler 2001). Adler’s study brings evidence that 215 Fortune 500 firms (from 
1980 to 1998) show a strong correlation between promoting women into the executive 
suite and high profitability. Under three measurements of performance (profits as a 
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percentage of revenues, profits as a percentage of assets, and profits as a percentage of 
stockholder’s equity), Adler’s study proved that firms that had women in the executive 
suite had better results than the other firms. However, another related study from 1999, 
shows that there had been no progress with respect to women as CEOs from 1987 to 
1996, and there was no evidence that such progress would likely be forthcoming in the 
future (Daily 1999, 96-97).  
I will investigate whether there has been a progress in this regard by examining 
all Norwegian firms (both PLC and LTD) over the past decade. A specific aspect that I 
will take into account is the Norwegian gender quota obliging all PLC companies to 
have 40% females on the board of directors. The government mandated the quota in 
2005. All PLCs registered after 1st January 2006 had to comply with the quota 
immediately. As for the other existing firms, they were given an interval of two years to 
meet the requirements of the law.  
Therefore, I will examine if the quota had an impact not only on board 
composition, but also on the changes in the CEO positions. In other words, are there 
significantly more women CEOs after the quota was implemented? 
The present study examines one of the most debated diversity issues, not only in 
terms of board diversity, but also in terms of female participation in the highest levels of 
management. These aspects are of imperious importance for policy makers. In recent 
years, there has been more and more pressure from both society and investors to assign 
women to director positions in corporations. This increasing pressure has led to equality 
laws in some countries, including Norway, which is of focus in this paper. Daily and 
Dalton (2003) consider that increasing female participation in higher levels of 
management is a business imperative. One of the reasons is that in a complex business 
environment, firms must make use of all available resources to compete effectively and 
women represent half of the workforce. Therefore, it is not efficient to loose the 
expertise, skills, knowledge, and background of females, which could contribute to the 
goodwill of the company.  
The paper is organized as follows: section 1 reviews the literature on corporate 
governance, board composition, and female representation in top management 
positions; section 2 presents the data and the methodology; section 3 analyzes the main 
determinants of CEO gender across different samples of firms and different time 
periods; section 4 looks at whether female-led companies perform better than male-led 
companies; section 5 summarizes the results and concludes; section 6 presents the 
limitations of the study.  
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II. Literature Review 
 
Motto: What the world needs today is not more competition but woman’s native 
genius for sympathetic co-operation. (Meyer 1953, p. 397)  
 
Overview of Corporate Governance Literature 
 
Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997, 737). This refers to the agency problem often known as the separation of 
ownership and control or the separation of management and finance. According to the 
definition given on the Oslo Stock Exchange (Oslo Børs) official website, corporate 
governance addresses the triangular interaction between a company's shareholders, 
board of directors, and management. In a somewhat wider context, corporate 
governance also embraces the relationship between a company and parties other than 
shareholders, such as employees, creditors, the local community, and other parties with 
whom the company has a connection.2  
In Shleifer and Vishny’s paper (1997), A Survey of Corporate Governance, the 
authors are dealing with the separation of financing and management as they are trying 
to analyze how this dissociation is handled with both in theory and in practice. Various 
methods and suggestions are given so as investors recuperate the money from the 
managers. Whether incentive contracts are offered to the managers3, legal protection to 
the investors and even considering the concentration of ownership4 as a way of 
leveraging up legal protection, the managers of the companies should serve the interests 
of all shareholders and not only theirs.  
When dealing with concentration of ownership, it is debatable which part should 
own more (the state, the institutional, the personal, the industrial or the international 
owners) in order to emulate countries with good corporate governance systems such as 
those suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) – United States, Germany, or Japan. 
Obviously, the type of governance system will strongly depend on which cultural and 
                                                 
2 In one word, stakeholders of the company. 
3 The forms of incentive contracts are: share ownership, stock options, and threat of dismissal if income is 
low (Berle and Means 1932 cited in Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  
4 The forms of concentration are: large shareholders, takeovers, and large investors.  
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legal framework the companies employ. For instance, most of the studies on large 
ownership structure focus on the U.S and UK firms. The findings of Short and Keasey 
(1998) confirm that national culture and governance systems have a major influence on 
the inception point at which managerial entrenchment occurs. Thus, a wider 
examination on the relationship between firm value and managerial ownership across 
different countries might bring new insights.  
In the attempt of discovering which represents the best fit of management 
ownership so as to maximize the value of a firm, numerous researches have been made 
in this field. One of the most representative is Management, Ownership and Market 
Valuation: An Empirical Analysis (Mork et al. 1986). The paper uses a sample of 456 of 
the Fortune 500 U.S firms and investigates the relationship between management 
ownership and market valuation of the firm measured by Tobin’s Q. The results show a 
positive relationship between ownership and Q in the 0% to 5% board ownership range, 
a negative and less pronounced relation in the 5% to 25% range and a further positive 
relation beyond 25%. In a related and more up to date study, Bhabra et al. (2003) 
examines the curvilinear relationship between director’s equity ownership and firm 
performance in the Singaporean economy. Firm value is also measured by Tobin’s Q, 
and the findings indicate that Q is positively related to director ownership in the 0% to 
20.34% range, negatively related in the 20.34% to 52.73% range, and again positively 
related when directors’ ownership exceeds 52.73%. These inflection points are higher 
than the ones in Mork, Shleifer, and Vishny (1986) of U.S firms. In addition to the 1986 
study, the research in Singaporean firms analyzes this relationship among three sub-
samples of firms: founder, government linked corporations, and corporate.  
In other connected research, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find a simple linear 
relation between profit rate (as an alternate measure of firm performance) and 
ownership by large shareholders, in contrast to Mork et al. (1986), who focus on 
ownership by management only. However, when estimating the relationship between 
the profit rate and board stake, Mork et al. (1986) get consistent results with the 
previous study from 1985. More refined results are obtained in later studies which 
capture a rather nonmonotonic relationship between profits and board ownership.  
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Board Composition and the Norwegian Gender Quota 
 
It is often questioned what is the role exerted by the boards and to what extent 
does their role matter within a corporation. By performing a linear regression between 
financial performance and governance attribute (e.g., measured by board size) gives an 
apparent negative relation which could easily lead to the conclusion that a firm would 
do better if it diminished the size of the board. However, as the survey by Adams et al. 
(2010) shows, this is not the case as for a given firm there is a nonmonotonic relation 
between the attribute and financial performance.  
In the Adams et al. (2010) survey on the role of board of directors in corporate 
governance, possible answers range from boards’ being simply legal necessities, 
something akin to the wearing of wings in English courts, to their playing an active part 
in the overall management and control of the corporation. Other possible roles might be: 
setting the strategic direction of the company, the corporate policies, the overall 
direction, mission and vision (Demb and Neubauer 1992 cited by Adams et al. 2010). 
Another important role ascribed to directors is control of the process by which top 
executives are hired, promoted, assessed, and, sometimes, even fired.  
In my paper, I analyze the observable category of characteristics with focus 
upon gender. Gender is one of the most discussed diversity issue not only within 
corporations, but also in politics. Along the years there have been various quota systems 
aimed to raising representation of women both in government structures5, and also on 
boards. One example is the coalition of the Norwegian government in 2002 who asked 
companies to comply with a new quota that all public limited companies should make 
their boards be comprised of 40% female6 members. The gender equality rule does 
thereby not apply to private limited liability companies. The stated reason for not 
including the private companies is the typical nature of Norwegian private companies. 
Their shares are less dispersed compared with public companies (as only public 
companies can offer shares to the public), and Norwegian private companies are 
                                                 
5 Gender quotas exist for political parties in countries such as France and Sweden.  
6 A weaker imitation of the law passed by the Norwegian government is the Spanish government’s 
Gender Equality Act (Ley de Igualidad) in March 2007. The law requires that 40% of candidates on 
political party ballots should be female, and it encourages greater employment of women by giving 
companies with greater ratio of female to male employees preferential treatment when bidding for 
government contracts. It also recommends, but does not require, firms negotiating for public contracts to 
have at least 40 % of the least represented gender on their boards by 2015 (Miguez and Martin). 
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typically family-controlled with the shareholders also being the members of the board 
(Reiersen and Sjåfjell 2008).  
The quota was mandated on 9th December 2005 and was only addressed to 
public limited companies (PLC). The deadline for meeting the new regulation was 2008 
and the sanction for non-compliance was firm liquidation (Nygaard 2011). Therefore, 
according to the Norwegian Business Register, by 2008 all PLC firms were in 
accordance with the law. However, some firms succeeded in evading the law by 
conversing from PLC to LTD corporate form. Results from the abovementioned paper 
suggest that, indeed, the conversion rate is associated with the quota. Nevertheless, for 
the non-listed PLC firms, results show that there is a strong negative correlation 
between the conversion decision and the share of female directors in both 2006 and 
2007. This is consistent with the fact that the quota only had an impact after it was 
mandated in December 2005 (Nygaard 2011).  
A similar study examines the differences in firm performance measured by 
profit among both listed and non-listed Norwegian firms. Matsa an Miller (2011) 
proved that the impact of the quota is negative: profits declined after 2006 by 2.7 % of 
assets among listed firms relative to the change in profits in unlisted firms during the 
same time period.  
Using a sample of 200 large U.S firms, Shrader et al. (1997) did not find any 
significant relationship between the percentage of women in the upper management and 
firm performance. In 2009, Adams and Ferreira studied a sample of firms from 1996-
2003 and found a negative relationship between gender diversity and both ROA and 
Tobin’s Q. In another study of 250 listed companies from 200-2006, Hussein and Kiwia 
(2009) found no relationship between female board representation and Tobin’s Q.  
However, Adler’s (2001) results are different from previous ones. He found that 
there is a strong correlation between women-friendliness and firm profitability. The 
sample in his study comprised of 25 Fortune 500 firms and showed a strong 
participation of women in executive slots. In Canadian firms, Francoeur, Labelle, and 
Sinclair-Desgagne (2007) found a positive correlation between female officers and 
financial performance, but no relationship between women directors and performance. 
Adams and Ferreira’s results from the 2009 paper suggest that mandating gender 
quotas for directors can reduce ﬁrm value for well-governed ﬁrms. This result could 
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occur because token7 members are often marginalized as representing the “women’s” or 
the “minority’s” point of view, as if it were a monolithic position (Rhode 2010, 18).  
According to Martin’s survey (2007) on women power on higher levels of 
management from France, often, women regard quotas as rather pernicious for them. 
Imposing women by force could be, in a way, looking down on them. A specific quota 
for women could be interpreted as an underestimation of the women’s capability to 
move beyond the glass ceiling through merit, competence, and courage (Martin 2007).  
Another important paper on women representation on boards is Adams and 
Funk’s study from 2009. Their findings show that women who made it past the glass 
ceiling have something particular. Unlike women in general, women directors seem to 
be more prone to risk. Adam and Funk (2009) surveyed CEOs of publicly traded 
Swedish firms and showed that female and male directors differ systematically in their 
core values and risk attitudes. Even though, in general, women are more risk averse than 
men, the results from the survey show that female directors are more inclined to take 
risks than men are.  
In the case that women directors are, indeed, more risk loving than men 
directors, then one would expect a firm with more women on board to perform better. 
Performance is a broad term and includes not only profitability, but also risk. 
Markowitz marked these aspects when he first developed the Portfolio Selection 
Theory. Therefore, an investor will take more risk because he/she assumes to obtain 
more profitability and vice versa. Firms with less risky investments will have less 
profitability.  
Further research in a wide number of countries would facilitate a comparative 
study of the impact of institutional and cultural differences of diversity factors both on 
the CEO and on the board of directors. As far as gender is concerned, according to 
Catalyst8 2012 news report, the Swedish corporate boards have 27.3 % female 
members; Finland has 24.5 %, Canada 10.3 %, and Denmark 13.9 %. By contrast, 
women occupy fewer than 10% of corporate seats in China (8.5 %), Mexico (6.8 %), 
and the Arab countries.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Tokenism is a formal or superficial compliance with a law, requirement, convention, especially in the 
hiring of members of a minority group. 
8 Catalyst is the leading research and advisory organization in North America which fosters the 
advancement of women in business.  
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The CEO’s Characteristics and his Role in the Company 
 
Even though it would be at least challenging to analyze the structure of the board 
and correlate it with firm performance and with other efficiency indicators, the present 
paper is describing the relationship of the CEO with the board and the way the CEO’s 
attributes influence the firm’s performance.  
Boards and CEOs’ attributes have been a subject of interest in a wide range of 
domains: including accounting, management, law, sociology, and psychology. From the 
financial point of view, a deeper insight towards the board of the companies as well as a 
more detailed view upon its role and its relationship with the CEO of the company may 
offer new approaches of the agency problem (in the way that the CEOs’ incentives 
could be misaligned with those of the shareholders’). 
According to Hermalin and Weisbach’s survey from 2010 on board of directors 
and CEOs, a CEO that has a good performance can win on two sides: he might bargain 
for more compensation and he might also bargain on the degree of the board’s 
independence because it is assumed he would rather prefer to remain CEO than be fired.  
An interesting aspect worth dwelling upon is observing the evolution of the 
CEO’s salary in parallel with board independence and monitoring by the board. An 
increase in the CEO’s salary signals that the board is more willing to budge on the issue 
of independence (willingness to monitor) than salary; hence, there is movement on 
independence (Adams et al. 2010). A CEO who performs well faces a less independent 
board, whereas a CEO who performs poorly is susceptible to being fired or replaced. As 
a conclusion, measures of CEO bargaining power, tenure, and the CEO’s share are 
negatively correlated with board independence.  
Adams’s (2010) results are in accordance with Ryan and Wiggins’s (2004) 
findings that show that a CEO’s pay becomes less linked to equity performance as his 
control over the board increases (proxied by his tenure and proportion of insiders). 
These results are similar to the ones obtained by Babchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2010) 
who found that higher CPS9 is associated with lower firm value, lower accountability, 
profitability, and lower stock market returns accompanying the filling of proxy 
statements for periods where CPS increases.  
                                                 
9 CPS (CEO Pay Slice) is the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the firm’s top-five executive team 
captured by the CEO (Adams, Almeida and Ferreira 2005).  
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Nevertheless, in the organizational literature, there is some controversy whether 
top executives matter. It is debatable whether the CEO exercises power over firm 
profitability. Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Bertrand and Schoar (2003) cited by 
Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005, 1405) found some characteristics of top executives 
that are related to firm outcomes. These characteristics, often being the source of 
diversity, are of two categories: observable ones, which are readily detectable attributes 
of directors, and less visible ones, such as background of directors (Miliken and Martins 
196 cited by Kang et al. 2007). On one hand, the observable diversity category includes 
race ethnic background, nationality, gender, and age. On the other hand, the less 
observable diversity category comprises educational, functional and occupational 
backgrounds, industry experience, and organizational ownership.  
 
Women Power at the CEO Level 
 
Barnard (2006, 315-316) names the women who get to the top or near the top of 
their respective corporate pyramids the “Alpha Women”, and those who are CEOs, the 
“Elite”. Barnard’s survey on women who break the glass ceiling gives a different view 
on the circumstances under which women enter the executive sector. 
Women reach the top management especially when risk of failure is extremely 
high. This is consistent with Ryan and Haslam’s “edge-of-the-cliff” theory that occurs 
when women become the heads of troubled companies. Therefore, Ryan and Haslam 
hypothesised a particular scenario: “Rather than the appointment of women leaders 
precipitating a drop in company performance, it is equally plausible that a company’s 
poor performance could be a trigger for the appointment of women to the board”. A 
good example in this sense is Anne Mulcahy who was promoted to CEO of Xerox Corp. 
in August 2001. According to Business Week (2004), the time Anne was promoted, the 
company was “in terrible shape” and “it looked like a lost cause”. What is remarkable 
about the story is that the company returned to profitability at the end of 2001.  
However, Anne Mulcahy is not the only woman CEO who accomplished a 
corporate resurrection that seemed less likely at that moment in time. Mary Sammons - 
CEO of Rite Aid Corp., and Pat Russo – CEO of Lucent Technologies Inc. achieved a 
successful business turnaround when the companies were in precarious conditions.  
Even though there has been evidence showing that women participation in the 
boardroom is positively correlated with firm performance (Adler 2001; and Deszo & 
Ross 2008), findings from this paper suggest that having a female CEO is not 
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systematically related to performance. This result implies that there might be something 
particular about the CEO position, which interferes with the effectiveness of female 
managers. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) offer a possible explanation for the inability 
or unwillingness of women to achieve at least as good results as CEOs as they do when 
having board positions. For example, women have to face a series of milestones in their 
way beyond the glass ceiling. These obstacles could be represented by women’s 
aversion to competitive environments or men’s reluctance in cooperating with women.  
Further evidence sustains the negative or neutral effect of women CEOs on firm 
performance. The paper of Wolfers (2006) indicates that having a female CEO has no 
effect on firm performance. However, the author notes that his finding of a “zero gender 
effect” could leave space for interpretation. It could either mean that female CEO’s 
perform similar to men, or that the statistical power of the test is weak. There is also 
evidence that the stock market reacts unfavourably to the hiring of a female CEO (Lee 
and James 2007).  
It is widely known that CEOs are in their majority male, and according to Deszo 
and Ross (2008), ceteris paribus, men tend to be more favourably evaluated in roles 
occupied mainly by men. Eagly and Johnson (1990) motivate that women have less 
incentives to deviate from “masculine” behaviour when occupying such roles. Thus, a 
firm with a female CEO may have a poorer performance. 
All in all, the literature on senior management and its effects is wide as evidence 
is found at least since Barnard (1938). Economists have also taken a recent interest in 
the topic (e.g., Rhode 2010; Cremers and Peyer 2010). However, academic work on the 
relationship between female participation in top management and firm performance is 
relatively sparse. Most of the scientific papers focused on finding a relationship between 
board composition and firm performance (Adler 2001, Adams and Ferreira 2003, Matsa 
and Miller 2010) and very few on the connection between the CEO and firm 
performance.  
In my paper, I will investigate whether the number of female directors is 
associated with having a woman CEO over two time periods (prior the Norwegian 
gender quota and post quota) for all Norwegian firms. In other words, I will examine if 
female power at the CEO level became stronger or not after the quota.  
Moreover, I will extend the previous studies on the Norwegian quota and its 
effects on firm performance towards a different level of management: the CEO level. I 
will attempt to answer the following questions: are women making their firms perform 
better or have better performing firms been promoting women to senior positions? Are 
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only the better performing firms using their female human capital at their best? There 
are many metrics to answer these questions, but I will focus on finding a possible 
association between the gender of the CEO and financial performance measured by 
ROA and Profit-to-sales ratio for all Norwegian firms. 
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II. Data and Methodology 
 
II.1. CCGR Database 
 
The data used in the study was obtained from the database created by CCGR 
(Centre for Corporate Governance Research) at BI Norwegian Business School. 
According to the CCGR website, the centre’s objective is to improve the insight into 
how the governance of firms influences the welfare of its stakeholders. CCGR pays 
special attention to the private industry in general, and to non-listed firms and family 
firms in particular. 
CCGR focuses on empirical research and primarily studies Norwegian firms. 
CCGR database contains data that are difficult to obtain in other countries (such as 
unusually detailed ownership data for listed firms, and high-quality accounting data for 
non-listed firms) or data that reflects institutional environments that are unique 
internationally (such as mandatory representation of employees and females on the 
board of directors). 
As of 2012, the CCGR database consists of six tables and has 16 years of 
accounting data on corporate governance from 1994 to 2010, and 9 years of data on 
corporate governance from 2000 to 2009.  
My study comprises all Norwegian firms, both PLC and LTD over a period of 
nine years, from 2000 to 2009. Allmennaksjeselskap (literally "all men stock 
company"), or ASA, is the Norwegian term for a public limited company. "ASA" or 
"asa" is added to the company name of all Norwegian companies registered as 
Allmennaksjeselskap. ASA is an organizational form for large companies with 
numerous shareholders, liquid stock, and with minimum capital requirements that are 
ten times larger than the requirement for AS firms. ASA firms may or may not list 
shares on a public stock exchange, while an AS firm cannot list their shares on a public 
exchange. 
AS form of organization is destined for small companies with few shareholders 
and less liquid stock. An important difference between the two forms of organization is 
that only PLC (ASA) firms are subject to the Norwegian quota (Nygaard 2011). 
Moreover, the ASA differentiates from the Aksjeselskap or AS in that it has rules 
regulating its ownership. There cannot be any rules limiting the company's ownership to 
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certain interests and an ASA must offer a public tender to purchase stock, either new 
stock or from existing owners if the company is converted from an AS (Matsa and 
Miller 2011). Norwegian companies listed on the Stock Exchange must be ASAs. 
Norwegian banks are also ASAs, but they are exempt from certain regulation, including 
ownership regulation.  
In my research, I assume that all companies are independent. Therefore, I 
considered relevant to include in my analysis the corporate governance structure of 
subsidiaries, and parent companies as well.  
 
II.2. Samples  
 
I filtered the data choosing an interval of nine years from 2000 to 2009 and I 
ruled out all the small firms. I panelled the data into three subsamples: listed PLC firms 
on Oslo Stock Exchange (Oslo Børs) or Oslo Axess, non-listed PLC, and all LTD firms.  
According to the Oslo Stock Exchange official website, listing on Oslo Stock 
Exchange represents a full stock exchange listing that complies with all EU 
requirements, while listing on Oslo Axess gives companies access to an authorized and 
fully regulated marketplace. Listed companies are subject to all the obligations of stock 
exchange listing, regardless of the marketplace on which they are listed. Norwegian 
public limited companies and equivalent foreign companies can apply for their shares to 
be listed on Oslo Stock Exchange or on Oslo Axess. 
Oslo Stock Exchange is the most probable choice for larger companies that have 
an established track record and a wide distribution of shareholders. The Oslo Stock 
Exchange marketplace does not accept companies that are in a pre-commercial phase. 
On the other hand, Oslo Axess is more appropriate for companies that have less than 
three years' since their establishment, but seek for benefits associated with listing on a 
regulated marketplace10. Therefore, it can be concluded that Oslo Axess has more 
relaxed requirements than Oslo Stock Exchange.  
I corrected for LTD (AS) firms that were registered as listed in the CCGR data 
set as I considered these registrations as measurement errors. If a company can sell 
stocks on the exchange, it is by definition publicly traded and, therefore, not a private 
company.  
 
                                                 
10 http://www.oslobors.no/ob_eng/Oslo-Boers/Listing/Shares-equity-certificates-and-rights-to-shares/The-
difference-between-Oslo-Boers-and-Oslo-Axess 
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II. 3. Descriptive Statistics 
 
In this section of the paper, I briefly present the framework of the Norwegian 
quota and the descriptives for the data.  
 
The Norwegian Quota 
 
Policymakers in Europe have started to foster women’s enhancement in business 
leadership by adopting gender quotas for corporate boards of directors. Among the 
countries that took into consideration adopting such measures are Spain, France, 
Holland. According to the article “Getting Women into Boardroom, by Law’’ published 
in 2010 in The New York Times newspaper, Spain and the Netherlands have passed 
gender laws, similar to the Norwegian quota, with a 2015 deadline for compliance. The 
French Senate will debate a bill phasing in a female quota by 2016, after the National 
Assembly’s approval. Belgium, Britain, Germany and Sweden are also considering 
similar legislations. 
The only mandatory gender quota in effect was mandated in Norway in 2005. 
The law required that all boards of directors for all publicly traded firms should have a 
40% proportion of female members. The sanction for non-compliance was liquidation 
of the firm. Therefore, all PLCs registered after January 2006 were required to meet the 
law immediately, whereas all the other PLCs had to comply with the law by 1st January 
2008 (Nygaard 2011).  
The firms that found the change of the board as a burden and too difficult to 
comply with in the required time interval could evade the law by converting into the 
LTD corporate form. As can be seen from graph 1 and table 1, the number of PLC 
firms decreased to approximately one half from 578 in 2000 to 307 in 2009. If a non-
listed PLC could easily adopt the form of a LTD, a listed PLC would first need to delist 
from Oslo Stock Exchange or Oslo Axess. There is a steeper decrease in the number of 
non-listed PLCs in comparison with the listed PLCs. As can be seen from graph 1, by 
the end of 2009, the number of both the listed and non-listed PLCs becomes almost 
equal (149 listed PLCs in 2009, and 158 non-listed PLCs in the same year, 
respectively). On the other hand, according to graph 2 and table 2, the number of LTD 
firms rose 1.47 times more from 2000 to 2009. The considerable raise in the number of 
LTD firms could be due to the fact that a lot of PLCs converted to LTD in order to 
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evade the law or simply because of the proper economic environment to start new 
businesses.  
Nevertheless, the most sudden increase in the number of LTDs can be observed 
during the interval of 2005 - 2006. I believe that one of the most important reasons for 
the sudden increase was the conversion decision from PLC to LTD in 2005 and 2006. 
As Nygaard noted in his paper (2011), the conversion decision corresponds with the 
legislative process of the quota as the law had a significant impact after it was mandated 
in 2005. 
If at the beginning of 2000 only 4.37% of the board was represented by women, 
by 2009 all PLC firms had 40% female representatives on the board of directors. 
According to the legislative process of the Norwegian quota, in April 2008, all PLCs 
were in compliance, and no firm was sanctioned with liquidation for failing to comply 
with the law11.  
However, the year after the deadline for meeting the law had passed (2008), in 
2009, the average ratio of women directors slightly decreased from the required 40% to 
38.62%12. The inconsistency in the evolution of the representation of women in the 
executive suite could be explained by the forced changes imposed by the state within a 
certain deadline, rather than changes coming from the boards’ own initiative of 
promoting and encouraging women in top positions. It is possible that after the danger 
of liquidation had passed, some firms could have returned to approximately the same 
board composition they had before the quota. This could have happened by temporarily 
appointing female family members to the board in order to meet the law.  
According to table 1, the average number of directors for PLC companies 
maintained a relatively constant size over the sample period. This is of particular 
interest as it implies that firms preferred to supersede the male directors with female 
directors rather than increase the board size in order to comply with the law. In their 
study that only included the listed firms on Oslo Stock Exchange from 2001 to 2009, 
Ahern and Dittmar (2011) made the same observation about the relatively constant size 
of the board over the time interval.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 For a brief description of mean number of female members on the board of directors across different 
types of firms (PLC listed, PLC non-listed, and LTD) see graphs 3-8 from Appendix.  
12 See graph 7 and table 1 from Appendix 
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CEO Age and CEO Gender 
 
Tables 1 and 2 show that female CEOs are slightly younger than male CEOs for 
both PLC and LTD firms over the sample period.  
These finding could find support in Ahren and Dittmar’s paper from 2011 on 
female board representation. They argue that since a lot of board members are present 
or past CEOs, the new female directors are likely to be less experienced than the male 
directors and this could explain the age gap between women and male CEOs. In an 
interview for The New York Times newspaper from 2010, Elin Myrmel-Johansen, a 36 
year old executive vice president at Storebrand, the Norwegian financial services group, 
says: “We don’t need everybody to be the same age, from the same schools, reading the 
same magazines. Often younger people are better able to spot new market trends.” 
For the PLC firms, graph 9 illustrates that over the years, the age gap between 
male and female CEOs seems to have decreased as a male CEOs is younger and closer 
to that of the female CEO. Moreover, graph 9 also shows that during the last decade the 
mean age at which a woman could be promoted as CEO was around 53, while in 2009 
the mean age for a female CEO decreased to 50. This shows that a female could become 
CEO at a younger age than in the last nine years. In addition, graphs 10 and 11 show 
how the total number of female CEOs had increased over the sample period. The 
presence of women in CEO positions had increases from 4.6% in 2000 to 7.3% in 2009. 
Even though the increase was only 2.7% in a nine year interval, it shows that women 
had made their way towards top management positions.  
The increase of the total number of female CEOs (see graph 10) as well as the 
number of female directors among the PLC (see graph 7) firms could be a prime 
indicator of the stated purpose of the gender quota, that of balanced participation for 
democracy and equality. According to the Human Development Report (2009), Norway 
ranks the country number 2 in the United Nations Gender-Related Development Index 
of 2007.  
Even though the number of female CEOs had increased over the past years, men 
still seem to dominate the top positions. Graph 12 shows the distribution of the number 
of CEOs across different panels of firms. It can easily be observed that the percentage of 
male CEOs heavily outnumbers the percentage of female CEOs during the whole 
sample period (see graph 13). Interestingly, results show that the proportion of female 
CEOs of non-listed PLCs (5.9%) is higher than that of listed PLCs (3%). As graph 11 
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shows, there had been a continuous increase in the number of women promoted in CEO 
positions for the non-listed PLCs beginning with 2006 (from 5.6% to 11.1% percentage 
of women CEOs with respect to the total number of CEOs registered in the respective 
year). I believe this result is of major importance as it shows the general tendency of 
firms in promoting more and more women to the highest positions in a company. This 
could be interpreted as a further attempt by women to break the so called glass ceiling.  
 
“Side-effects” of the Norwegian Quota 
 
Whether the quota had a true impact on the increase of the number of female 
CEOs or the increase of female CEOs during the last years is independent of the law, 
remains under further investigation. However, my view is that the scope of the reform, 
namely, equality between sexes for a fairer society, can be interpreted and observed not 
only at the board level, but also at the CEO level.  
Moreover, other effects regarding the evolution of women promotion on higher 
management levels can also be observed for the firms that were not subject to the quota. 
Graph 11 indicates that the proportion of female CEOs increased over the last years for 
the LTD firms as well. On one hand, this increase could be due to the general economic 
tendency of increasing equality among sexes (so called “side-effects” of the Norwegian 
quota). On the other hand, the increase can either be due to the fact that a lot of PLC 
firms converted into LTD firms in 2005 (so the mean number of female CEOs for LTD 
firms increased with the conversion phenomenon) or simply because of the prosperous 
environment for founding new LTD firms.  
 
Women CEO’s Salary 
 
Another relevant aspect worth mentioning is the pay or salary of the female 
CEOs prior and post quota.  
For the prior quota sample, graph 14 shows that for most age groups, women 
CEOs are paid under the mean annual salary (1.1895 mil NOK). However, for the 55-60 
age group, female CEOs are paid more than the average and even more than men, 
exceeding 1.5 mil NOK per year. The highest salary for female CEOs was attained 
around the age of 57 with a value of app. 3 mil NOK per year. 
For the post quota sample, graph 15 shows that for most age groups, women 
CEOs are paid under the mean annual salary (2.0621 mil NOK). However, for the 45-50 
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and 55-60 age groups, female CEOs are paid more than the average and even more than 
men exceeding 4.5 mil NOK per year for the 45-50 age group. Graph 15 shows how 
women CEOs gained more and more dominance, outnumbering the male CEOs in two 
age groups compared with the prior-quota period when women CEOs outnumbered 
male CEOs only in the 55-60 age group.  
It is also interesting to see how the maximum attainable salary for a woman 
CEO raised five times in the post-quota period in comparison with the highest salary 
during the prior-quota period. Moreover, it can also be shown that not only did the 
salary substantially increase, but the average age of a female CEO susceptible to 
receiving a high salary had decreased to below 50 years old. This indicates that, 
nowadays, a female CEO can receive more money at a younger age than in the past.  
  
Women CEOs across Industry Sectors 
 
A lot of researchers have sought to find various associations between industry 
sectors and characteristics of the corporate governance systems of the firm. For 
example, Kang et al. (2007) in their study on diversity and independence of Australian 
boards found that industry type is significantly associated with the independence of 
directors and age range, but not with gender diversity. However, Hyland and Marcellino 
(2002) found a significant relationship between industry and the percentage of female 
directors on board using a sample of top 100 public companies in a suburban region of 
the USA.  
According to the Official Statistics of Norway, from 2008 Norway uses a 
revised industrial classification, SIC2007 (Standard Industrial Classification). The 
classification corresponds to EU's revised industrial classification, NACE rev.2. Since 
1994 the Standard Industrial Classification has been prepared on the basis of EU's 
international industrial standard NACE rev.1 (Nomenclature générale des activités 
economiques dans les Communautés Européenes). This standard was updated in 2002 
(NACE rev.1.1.). The standard has a five level hierarchical structure: section, division, 
group, class, and subclass.  
In my research, I used the 17 industry sections for 2000-2007 (NACE rev 1), and 
the 21 industry sections for 2008-2009 (NACE rev 2).  
Table 4 shows the distribution of the CEOs by gender for all Norwegian firms 
across 17 industry sectors according to the NACE rev 1 classification standards.  
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The pie chart (graph 16) shows that the industry sector in which there are the 
most numerous female CEOs among both PLC and LTD Norwegian firms are: private 
households with employed persons (37.5%); other community, social and personal 
service activities (32.8%); and health and social work (29.6%). On the other side, the 
sectors with the least numerous female CEOs are: construction (2.3%); fishing (4.1%); 
and mining and quarrying (6%).  
As far as the firms that were subject to the Norwegian quota are concerned, table 
5 shows the distribution of the CEOs by gender for all PLC firms across industry sectors 
for the 2000-2007 time interval13.  
The following graph (graph 17) shows the clustered bar chart of CEO gender 
and industry sectors for all Norwegian PLCs 2000-2007 (NACE rev 1). The X axis 
represents the most relevant industry sectors for the time period 2000-2007. The Y axis 
represents the mean annual CEO salary expressed in mil NOK. The Y reference line is 
the average salary line (1.558 mil NOK per year). The chart shows that most of the 
industry sectors are dominated by male CEOs who are also better paid than the female 
CEOs. However, for the transport and communication sector, as well as for the financial 
intermediation sector, the female CEOs dominate the men CEOs as they are better paid 
and more numerous at the same time. It is obvious that for these particular industry 
sectors female 
CEOs are paid 
over the average.  
 
Graph 17. 
Clustered bar 
chart of CEO 
gender and 
industry sectors 
for all Norwegian 
PLC firms  
2000-2007 
(NACE rev1) 
 
 
                                                 
13 For 2008-2009 time interval, see tables 6 and 7 from Appendix 
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There is no clear pattern in female representation across industry sectors at the 
CEO level during the sample period 2000-2007. Graph 18 indicates that the greatest 
increase in female CEO representation can be seen in the other community, social and 
personal service activities sector, as well as in the wholesale and retail trade in 2005 and 
2006, respectively.  
As far as the second period is concerned, 2008-2009, the clustered bar chart 
below (graph 19) shows that in most of the sectors, male CEOs are better paid than 
female CEOs with the exception of three industry sectors. These sectors are: 
transportation and storage; financial and insurance activities; and professional, scientific 
and support service activities. Not only women CEOs are better paid than men in these 
sectors, but they are also paid above the mean (2.2229 mil NOK per year).  
 
Graph 19. Clustered bar chart of CEO gender and industry sections for all Norwegian 
PLC firms during 2008-2009 time period 
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II.4. Objectives and Regression Models 
 
It is of interest to test whether the quota also had an impact on the CEO’s gender 
and not just the on the composition of the board. Taking into consideration that one of 
the main attributes of directors is to monitor and advice the CEO, a change in the board 
composition could also be reflected upon the decision of a possible replacement of the 
CEO. Is the likelihood of hiring a female CEO higher after the quota than before the 
quota was mandated? Did the changes in the board of directors have an effect on the 
CEO as well? 
On the other hand, there seems to be room for CEO’s personal preferences to 
influence the selection of directors in Norwegian PLCs, at least prior to the quota 
(Nygaard 2011). How do the CEO characteristics influence firm performance? 
To test for the hypotheses, I used a cross-sectional data set containing all 
Norwegian firms from 2000 to 2009. I structured the data in a longitudinal manner or in 
a stacked cross section to perform binary logit, and OLS regressions14.  
 In order to find the factors which determine the CEO gender, or more 
specifically, to find the characteristics of the firms that are more likely to have a female 
CEO than a male CEO, I conduct a binomial logit model15. The dependent variable is 
the CEO gender, the independent variable is the ratio of female directors, and the 
control variables are: firm age, firm size (proxied by natural logarithm of sales), board 
size, and ROA. The control variables are in accordance with the ones used in previous 
similar papers (Nygaard 2011 and Ahern 2011).  
 To test for significance, I use the maximum likelihood (ML) test. The ML test 
is consistent and asymptotically efficient (unbiased and minimum variance for large 
samples). With large samples, ML has the added advantage of producing normally 
distributed coefficient estimates, allowing for the use of typical hypothesis testing 
techniques. Therefore, the null hypothesis is that all population coefficients except the 
constant are zero (Studenmund 2006). 
I assume that the models are nested, so I perform regressions in block, 
progressively adding independent variables to the model. 
 
                                                 
14 See tables 8 and 9 for descriptive statistics  
15 The binomial logit is an estimation technique for equation with dummy dependent variables that avoids 
the unboundness problem of the linear probability model by using a variant of the cumulative logistic 
function (Studenmund 2006). 
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CEO gender = β*ratio of female directors + Σ control variables + ε 
 
To test the relationship between firm performance and CEO characteristics, I ran 
cross-sectional OLS regressions. ROA (Return on Assets) is set as the dependent 
variable and CEO characteristics (gender, salary, age) are set as independent variables 
using a set of control variables (firm size, firm age, board size, gender diversity). I 
reduced the sample size to only the firms that survived during the whole time period 
(2000-2009)16.  
 
ROA = β0 *CEO gender + β1 *CEO salary + β2*CEO age + Σ control variables 
(ln(sales), firm age, board size, gender diversity) + ε 
 
Using ROA as a measure of firm performance is consistent with previous similar 
researches (Nygaard 2011, and Adams and Ferreira 2005). In his research on the 
Norwegian gender quota, Nygaard (2011) finds that the change in ROA mostly depends 
on the information index; for low information asymmetry firms, ΔROA is positive; 
whereas for high information asymmetry firms, ΔROA is negative.  
In their study on CEOs and their impact on corporate performance, Adams and 
Ferreira (2005) use a sample of publicly traded firms in the 1998 Fortune 500 from 
1992 to 1999. They find that the most significant effect on firm performance is due to 
the CEO’s position and title as founder or only insider on the board.  
To test for robustness of the OLS regression, I perform another set of 
regressions, using Profit-to-sales ratio as the measurement for firm performance. Profit-
to-sales ratio shows how many cents of profit are earned on each euro of sales (Sutton 
2004, 51). The ratio can be calculated using various measures of profit (in this particular 
case, I used the net profit) and it provides insight into a firm’s cost structure.  
 
Profit-to-sales ratio = β0 *CEO gender + β1 *CEO salary + β2*CEO age + Σ control 
variables (ln(sales), firm age, board size, gender diversity) + ε 
 
 
                                                 
16 For each firm I calculated the difference in ΔROA = ROA2000 – ROA2009 Therefore, I deleted the firms 
that had missing value for ΔROA and kept in the analysis only the firms which maintained their existence 
throughout the whole sample. Using this procedure, I managed to keep a constant sample of firms over 
the years and, thus, making the results more accurate. 
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Gender diversity is measured by the ratio of female directors on the board. 
Matsa and Miller’s study from 2011 on the impact of the Norwegian gender quota on 
profits shows that after the quota, the ratio of operating profits to assets among affected 
firms decreased by about 4 percentage points, relative to firms that were unaffected by 
the law. Therefore, it is expected that in my paper, I will also find negative coefficients 
for gender diversity.  
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III. Determinants of CEO Gender 
 
III. 1. Hypothesis 1 
 
There is a link between the Norwegian gender quota and female representation 
at the CEO level. 
 
I used a binomial logit model dividing the sample in two periods (prior quota 
2000-2004, and post quota 2005-2009) for all firms.   
Both for the prior quota sample (2000-2004) and for the post quota sample 
(2005-2009), I am modeling on four sub samples (listed PLCs, non-listed PLCs, all 
PLCs, and all LTDs). Only cases where all dependent and explanatory variables are 
complete are included in the analysis. The categorical variable for gender has reference 
category of female17.  
 
III.2. Cross-Section Analysis 
 
Results for the Prior Quota Sample for all PLC Firms 
 
Results from table 10 - panel C show that when adding all the explanatory 
variables to the model reduces the -2 log likelihood by 36.125 (Model Chi-square) with 
5 degrees of freedom. The -2 log likelihood is a measure of how well the model 
explains variations in the outcome of interest, the CEO gender. The -2 log likelihood 
(sometimes called, deviance) has a chi squared distribution. The p value for the result of 
adding all explanatory variables to the model is .001. Hence, it can be concluded that 
the model is statistically significant at the 1% level (all variables explain variation in the 
CEO gender) and the null hypothesis is rejected.  
Therefore, results from table 1 - panel C show that the estimated model 
becomes: 
 
Logit(CEO gender) = -.646 + 4.543*ratio of female directors + .008*firm age  
-.096*firm size - .385*board size + .000*ROA  
                                                 
17 1 for female and 0 for male 
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However, in this model only the coefficients for ratio of female directors and 
board size are statistically significant at 1% level as their p-value is lower than .01. The 
model which includes all variables explains between 3% and 12.1% of the variation in 
CEO gender for all PLC firms in the prior quota period (as expressed by the Cox and 
Snell R2 , and by Nagelkerke R2).  
The odds ratio for female directors is 93.975, which means that for each increase 
in the ratio of female directors18, the company is 93.975 times more likely to have a 
female as a CEO having allowed for the control variables in the model. This number is 
very high as it indicates a strong connection between women on the board and their 
preference towards having a female CEO. Moreover, the high value could be justified 
by the fact that the increase in the ratio of female directors is the variable taken into 
consideration, and not the increase in the number of female directors. In addition, by 
performing the same regression and substituting the ratio of female directors with the 
number of female directors, the odds ratio becomes 2.176 (as shown in table 10’’). This 
number shows that with each additional female director on the board, the company is 
2.176 times more likely to have a woman CEO. Implicitly, when substituting for ratio of 
male directors on board and for the number of male directors, the coefficients are 
negative. The negative coefficient of the number of male directors could be interpreted 
as the men’s resistance of allowing a female to take the CEO position of the company.  
Nevertheless, results from table 10 – panel C show that the coefficient for board 
size is negative and the odds ratio is .681, which suggests that with every increase in the 
board of directors, the CEO of the firm is .681 times less likely to be a female. Even 
though this result somehow contradicts the previous finding (that with every increase in 
the number of female directors, the company is more than two times likely to have a 
woman CEO), it shows that an additional member on the board would most probably be 
a male. As documented by Farrell and Hersch (2001), the probability of adding a 
woman to a board in a given year is inversely related to the number of women directors 
already on the board.  
Oakley (2000) finds that men show a form of resistance to working with women. 
It seems that male CEOs overestimated the progress being made to designate female 
CEOs. Thus, men may feel reluctant in allowing more female power in the upper 
echelons of corporations.  
 
 
                                                 
18 The ratio of female directors is the number of female directors divided by the board size. 
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Results for the Post Quota Sample for all PLC Firms 
 
Results from table 11 – panel C show that performing the same regression 
described previously for the post quota period, the new model reduces the -2 log 
likelihood by 47.562 with 5 degrees of freedom. The p value for the result of adding all 
explanatory variables to the model is .001. Hence, it can be concluded that the model is 
statistically significant (all variables explain variation in the CEO gender) at the 1% 
level, and thus, the null hypothesis is rejected.  
Therefore, the results from table 11 - panel C show that the estimated model for 
the post quota period is: 
 
Logit(CEO gender) = -1.625+ 4.551*ratio of female directors + .017*firm age 
 -.1*firm size - .318*board size + .01*ROA  
 
In this model the coefficients for ratio of female directors, firm age, and board 
size are all statistically significant at the 1% level as their p-value is lower than .01. The 
model which includes all variables explains between 4.6 and 14.1% of the variation in 
CEO gender for all PLC firms in the post quota period (as expressed by the Cox and 
Snell R2, and by Nagelkerke R2).  
The odds ratio (relative odds) for female directors is 94.713, which is higher 
than the one from the prior quota sample (93.975). This suggests that after the quota, 
women in the board can exert more influence at the CEO level. Therefore, it becomes 
more probable that a firm will have a female CEO than before the quota. Performing the 
same regression and substituting the ratio of female directors with the number of female 
directors, the odds ratio becomes 3.349 (statistically significant at 1% level), which 
once again is higher than the one from the prior quota period (2.176). This result shows 
that after the reform, women had gained more power and control on the higher levels of 
management.  
Nevertheless, the coefficient for board size is negative and the odds ratio is .728, 
which suggests that with every increase in the board of directors, the CEO of the firm is 
.728 times less likely to be a female. Interestingly, the odds ratio for board size is higher 
than the one from the prior quota sample (.681). The results from table 11 show that 
after all firms had met the law, it became even less probable that bringing an additional 
member on the board would still be a woman (fact demonstrated by the slight decrease 
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in the number of female directors after 200619). Therefore, the probability of the 
company to have a female CEO decreases with the size of the board. 
The coefficient for company age is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The odds ratio is 1.017, which means that for each year increase in company age, 
the firm is 1.017 times more likely to have a female CEO. This result could suggest that 
older firms are more prone to having a female CEO.  
 
Overall Results 
 
An important observation is that all the coefficients for the ratio of female 
directors and for the number of female directors are positive and statistically significant 
at 1% level for all samples. This shows that not only does the number of female 
directors on the board constitute a good predictor for the CEO gender, but it also 
indicates that more women on the board of directors means more chances that the 
designated CEO will be a woman. Conversely, more men on the board of directors 
indicate less probability that the CEO of the firm will be a woman.  
It is interesting to observe how the odds ratio for female representation on board 
became higher for all the PLC firms after the reform. This means that the increase in the 
number of female CEOs after 2005 cannot be interpreted as a random effect, but as a 
phenomenon that could be attributed to the quota.  
However, not the same can be said for the LTD companies, which were not 
subject to the quota. As indicated by tables 10’’ and 11’’ panel D, the odds ratio for the 
number of female directors decreased from 10.16 to 10.02 after the quota. It seems that 
after the quota, even though the proportion of women directors increased, it is more 
difficult for a woman from a LTD company to occupy a CEO position than for a woman 
from a PLC company.  
Unlike the PLC group (both prior and post quota), the LTD group has a positive 
coefficient for board size indicating that an additional member to the board makes the 
firm more probable to having a woman in the position of the CEO. This result could 
mean that the PLC firms would rather have a male as an additional member of the 
board, whereas the LTD firms would prefer giving a seat on the board to a woman.  
Another noticeable difference between the LTD firms and the PLC firms is that 
for the PLC firms - the older the firm, the more probable the CEO would be a woman, 
                                                 
19 See table 1 from Appendix 
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whereas for LTD firms – the older the company, the more likely a man would take the 
position of the CEO.  
As far as firm size is concerned (proxied by natural logarithm of sales) for the 
post quota period, the coefficients are negative for the post quota sample (except for the 
non-listed PLCs). This suggests that the larger the firm, the less probable a woman will 
take the position of a CEO.  
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IV. Female CEOs and Firm Performance 
 
This section asses the impact of CEOs on firm outcomes. In the organizational 
literature, the topic on the importance of top executives is quite debatable.  
Researchers like Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) claim that managers do not 
matter. They found that CEO effects have little additional explanatory power for firm 
performance. Conversely, other authors claim that CEO are important for the firm’ 
outcomes (Weiner and Mahoney 1981). Do companies seek for CEOs for their 
characteristics? If so, which are the characteristics related to the firm outcomes? 
As measurement for firm performance, I used return on assets (ROA) which is in 
accordance with similar related studies (Nygaad 2011, Ahern 2011). The research of 
Adams et. al (2005) on the CEO’s ability to influence decisions that will affect firm 
decisions also uses ROA as the appropriate measure for firm performance.  
Another measurement of performance that I also considered in my research is 
profit-to-sales ratio. This indicator was also used by Adler (2001) in his study on the 
influence that women in top management positions have on firm profitability.  
 
 IV.1. Hypothesis 2 
 
There is a relation between firm performance and the CEO’s characteristics. 
 
Results for the Prior Quota Sample  
 
Results from table 12 – panel C show that there is a negative relation between 
firm performance expressed in terms of returns on assets and having a woman in the 
position of the CEO. Holding all other factors constant, having a female CEO reduces 
ROA by .067 for all PLC firms. Among the PLC group of firms, the listed ones seem to 
be more negatively affected by having a woman in the position of the CEO (CEO 
gender has a coefficient of -.168 for the listed PLC firms, and a coefficient of -.06 for 
non-listed firms20). In addition, results from table 14 show a negative correlation 
between women CEOs and firm performance.  
 
                                                 
20 See table 12 panels A and B  from Appendix 
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Table 14. Correlation of the CEO gender with two different measures of profitability for 
the prior-quota sample (2000-2004) 
 
Prior quota sample 2000 - 2004 
Correlation of 
CEO gender 
with: 
A. Listed PLC 
firms 
B. Non-listed 
PLC firms 
C. All PLC 
firms 
D. All LTD 
firms 
Value Sig. Value Sig. Value Sig. Value Sig. 
1. ROA -.140* .054 -.027 .296 -.039 .185  -.004** .035 
2. Profit-to-
sales-ratio 
 .016 .428 -.033 .257 -.002 .482  -.002 .218 
Notes: Sig. is the p-value (significance level) for the one tailed test.  
* statistically significant at 10% level 
** statistically significant at the 5% level 
ROA (return on assets) shows the profit the company generates in a period on the total assets employed 
by it (Sutton 2004). ROA = Operating profit/Average total assets.  
In this table only the values of the correlation of the CEO gender with ROA for listed PLC and all LTD 
firms are significant. It shows a negative relation between ROA and a female CEO. 
 
As far as the CEO’s salary is concerned, results from table 12 – panel C show 
that for all PLC firms an increase in the CEO’s salary with one unit is beneficial for the 
overall performance, increasing the ROA by .002 holding all the other factors constant. 
However, not the same holds for the LTD firms. An increase in the CEO’s salary, 
decreases the ROA by .002 units.  
Findings from table 12 also show that the PLC group of firms do not perform so 
well when the CEO of the company is older. According to The New York Times article 
on women in the boardrooms (2010), the sharp increase in women as directors 
significantly reduced the average amount of senior executive-level experience on the 
boards at 130 of the biggest Norwegian companies. On the other hand, results show that 
the LTD group of firms perform better when the CEO of the company is older or has 
more experience. This could suggest that an older CEO with more experience would be 
preferred over a younger CEO for the LTD firms.  
As expected, results from table 12 indicate that firm performance is negatively 
correlated with board size (the larger the board, the worse the firm performs). However, 
this does not necessarily imply that small boards are associated with higher market 
valuation. The results would give a negative bias on the OLS estimate for board size 
caused by omitting variables from the estimation equation (Nygaard 2012).  
Even though the F tests are statistically significant at the 1% level for the PLC 
and the LTD firms’ samples, the values for R square are quite low showing that the 
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chosen model explains 7.7% of the variation of firm performance for the PLC firms and 
only .5% for the LTD firms.  
As far as women representation on the board is concerned, many papers focused 
on the relation between female directors and firm performance, especially in the context 
of the gender quotas currently discussed in some European countries. However, the 
findings differ from paper to paper suggesting there is no universal law underlying the 
relation between women directors and firm performance. If the results from the 
researches on the U.S market (Adler 2001, Adams and Ferreira 2004, Dezso and Ross 
2008) show a positive relationship between women in the executive suite and firm 
performance, previous research on the Norwegian quota (Matsa and Miller 2011) finds 
a negative relationship between female representation on the board and firm’s profits.  
Results from table 12 show that before the quota was mandated, there is a 
positive relation between the ratio of female directors (gender diversity) and ROA for 
all samples. However, before 2005, female representation on the board was below 16%. 
Therefore, the positive relation between the ratio of female directors and firm 
performance found for the prior quota sample does not tell much about the influence of 
women directors on performance. These results may serve in terms of comparison with 
the post quota sample.  
 
Results for the Post Quota Sample  
 
Results from table 13 show that for the post quota sample there is also a 
negative relation between having a woman CEO and firm performance (expressed in 
terms of ROA) for all firm samples.  
For the PLC sample, a woman in the position of the CEO reduces firm 
performance by .04 percentage points expressed in terms of ROA. The correlation table 
(table 15) also indicates a negative relation between female CEOs and firm 
performance. These results are in line with the ones obtained by Dezso and Ross (2008). 
They performed a study on a sample of U.S firms (1992-2006) and found that women in 
CEO positions have a neutral or negative effect on firm performance. Even though their 
research controlled for firm and industry effects, these effects are robust to the inclusion 
of lagged values of the performance measures. However, the inclusion of lagged values 
provided some indicative evidence of causality between having a woman CEO and firm 
performance.  
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Table 15. Correlation of the CEO gender with two different measures of profitability for 
the post-quota period (2005-2009) 
 
Post quota sample 2005 - 2009 
Correlation of 
CEO gender with: 
A. Listed PLC 
firms 
B. Non-listed 
PLC firms 
C. All PLC 
firms 
D. All LTD firms 
Value Sig. Value Sig. Value Sig. Value Sig. 
1. ROA -.044 .326 -.039 .298 -.035 .275 -.011*** .000 
2. Profit-to-sales-
ratio 
 .617*** .000 .026 .360 .334*** .000 -.002 .250 
Notes: Sig. is the p-value (significance level) for the one tailed test. 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level 
ROA (return on assets) shows the profit the company generates in a period on the total assets employed 
by it (Sutton 2004). ROA = Operating profit/Average total assets. The categorical variable for gender has 
reference category of female (1 for female and 0 for male). 
In this table the significant values are: correlation of CEO gender with profit-to-sales ratio for the listed 
PLCs (showing a positive relation between the profitability of the firm and a female CEO), the correlation 
of the CEO gender with profit-to-sales ratio for all PLC firms (indicating a positive relation between 
profitability and a female CEO), and the value of the correlation of the CEO gender with ROA for all 
LTD firms (showing a negative relation between ROA and a female CEO).   
 
Results from table 13- panels C and D indicate negative coefficients for CEO 
salary for all LTD firms and for all PLC firms. Therefore, a one unit increase in CEO’s 
pay decreases ROA by .009 percentage points for all PLC firms and by .004 for all LTD 
firms.  
Unlike the prior quota sample, for the post quota sample the relation between 
ratio of female members on the board and firm performance is negative for all PLC 
firms.  
The findings from table 13 are in accordance with the results from previous 
similar researches. For example, Matsa and Miller (2011) find that the ratio of operating 
profits to assets decreased after the quota was introduced and the strongest effects were 
observed among firms that were required to add the most women in order to comply 
with the law. According to The New York Times article on women in the boardrooms 
(2010), the sudden increase in Norwegian female directors “has done little – yet- to 
improve either the professional caliber of the boards or to enhance corporate 
performance.” On the other hand, for the firms that were not subject to the law, the 
results from table 13 show that the LTD firms did not encounter a negative effect on 
performance by increasing the ratio of female directors on board keeping all other 
variables constant.  
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The coefficients for board size are statistically significant for all post quota 
samples and have a negative sign. As in the prior quota sample, this shows that by 
adding new members to the board will not contribute to the goodwill of the firm.  
Without deeper analysis, it could wrongly be concluded that the firms would 
perform better if it diminished the size of its board. However, the problem of drawing 
such a conclusion is not to take into consideration why a large board might have been 
chosen in the first place (Hermalin and Weisbach 2010). According to Hermalin and 
Weisbach’s survey (2010) on board of directors in corporate governance, for a given 
firm there is a nonmonotonic relation between the attribute of governance (in this case, 
board size) and financial performance (in this case, ROA). When studying the nature of 
the relation between firm performance and governance attributes, it is very important to 
confront the issue of heterogeneity in the solutions adopted by the firms for their 
governance problems21.  
One important difference between the prior-quota sample and the post quota 
sample is that the value for R square increased for the PLC firms from only 7.7% (in the 
prior quota sample) to 14.1% (in the post quota sample). This means that after the quota 
was mandated, CEO’s characteristics became more relevant in explaining the variation 
in firm performance.  
The value for F test (6.737) is statistically significant at the 1% level and it 
shows the strong explanatory power of the chosen model.  
 
 IV.2. Robustness Checks 
 
 The robustness of the results obtained in the section above will be examined 
below. Most of the researches on the relation between firm performance and 
directorship use various measures for performance: Tobin’s Q (Ahern and Dittmar 
2011), profit-to-sales ratio (Adler 2001), ROA (Adams and Ferreira 2004, Nygaard 
2011). Robustness checks are useful because the researcher examines how certain 
"core" regression coefficient estimates behave when the regression specification is 
modified by adding or removing regressors (White and Lu 2010).  
 I run similar regressions for all firms as in the section above, but instead of 
using ROA as the measure for performance, I will use Profit-to-sales ratio as the 
appropriate measure for firm profitability.  
                                                 
21 A more complex empirical study would control for such heterogeneity by adding in other controls, for 
example, firm fixed effects.  
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 For the prior quota, table 12 shows that there is a negative relation between a 
female CEO and firm profitability for all types of firms. These results support the 
findings from the section where I use ROA as the measure for performance. Even 
though not statistically significant, results from table 14 also show negative correlations 
between a having a woman CEO and profit-to-sales ratio both for all PLC firms and for 
LTD firms.  
 As far as the post quota sample is concerned, results from table 13 show a 
different relation between female CEOs and firm performance. Unlike the use of ROA, 
it seems that the use of profit-to-sales ratio as the measure for firm performance gives 
positive results for PLC firms that have a woman CEO. Naming a woman CEO will 
raise the profit-to-sales ratio by .313 keeping constant all other factors. The positive 
correlation (.334 significant at the 1% level) for the PLC group of firms from table 15 
shows that firms perform better when having a female CEO.  
 The misaligned result with the previous one when ROA was used could be due 
to some countervailing factors that make the performance of women led companies 
difficult to gauge. Therefore, it is unclear whether firms that have women CEOs 
perform better than the other companies. More specifically, there is no concrete answer 
to the question if after the quota the companies that have women CEOs have better 
financial results than the men led companies. Either further investigation must be made 
or it is too soon to observe the effects women CEOs have on their companies.  
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V. Summary and Conclusions 
 
 The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of the Norwegian gender 
quota beyond its area of application, namely, women in CEO positions. I investigated 
whether there have been some noticeable changes at the CEO level after the quota and 
whether these changes affected firm performance. This research is especially timely 
given that gender diversity both at the board level and at the CEO level are significant 
corporate issues for the modern firm.  
 The descriptive part of the paper follows the evolution of female promotion in 
higher management positions along the time interval 2000-2009. Results show that after 
the Norwegian gender quota, more women became engaged in CEO positions, and, 
thus, enhancing female power in the business world. In addition, the paper presents the 
main industry sectors in which women are more likely to take CEO positions. Financial 
intermediation, transport and communication are the industry sectors for PLC firms 
where women CEOs outnumber the male CEOs.  
 The findings from this paper come to support Reiersen’s and Sjåfjell’s report 
(2008) on boardrooms in Norway showing that the quota had a positive effect on gender 
equality beyond its area of application. Not only did the quota make more space for 
women in the boardroom, but it also had positive indirect effects on the women willing 
to take even higher positions and win a seat at the executive table. Results from the post 
quota sample show a general tendency of diminishment of the gender gap at the CEO 
level, allowing for greater gender equality in the upper echelons of Norwegian firms.  
 Furthermore, I tested the main predictors of agency problem concerning the 
effect on firms’ profitability of increased female representation in top management. 
Even though previous researches (Adler 2001, Adams and Ferreira 2009) demonstrated 
that more women representation on the U.S boards brings more value to the firm, the 
main findings in this research reveal mixed results. In the case of using ROA as the 
appropriate measure for firm performance, the correlations between female CEOs and 
financial performance are negative for all firm samples.  
 Possible explanations for the negative relation between having a woman CEO 
and firm performance could be that women are unsuited to take leadership positions or 
they face too many obstacles in their way to the top management and, thus, loose their 
motivation to perform better. According to Ross and Deszo’s paper (2008) on women 
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representation in top management, the main milestones women have to overcome in 
order to break the glass ceiling are: resistance among men to working with women, lack 
of managerial experience, and difficulties in developing managerial talent. I believe 
these obstacles determine women to develop a sentiment of aversion towards working in 
highly competitive environments and towards taking too many responsibilities.  
 On the other hand, when using the profit-to-sales ratio, the coefficient for CEO 
gender is statistically significant and positive for the PLC firms in the post quota 
sample. The contradictory results obtained when using different measures for firm 
performance could probably be due to the fact that it is too soon to gauge women’s 
influence on the firm. The effects of women CEOs on performance will probably 
become more visible in the next few years. 
The results from this paper have implications for policies being discussed or 
implemented not only in Norway, but in other countries as well. Furthermore, the study 
could also address to organisations that foster the advancement of women in business.  
Overall, there are reasons to believe that the gender quota has led to some 
changes in the way women are perceived and promoted in top management positions. 
When recruiting a director or a CEO, instead of limiting the search to only one-half of 
the candidates, the search can be expanded to qualified women as well. I believe that the 
Norwegian quota represents one of the most courageous moves to demolish one of the 
most durable barriers to gender equality. At the same time, there has been made place 
for more competent businesspersons, and, thus, the business environment became more 
competitive. According to The New York Times article on women in the boardrooms 
(2010), when the Norwegian government first made its case for the quota, the number of 
women on boards had been growing by less than 1 percent a year for a decade. In an 
interview in 2010 for the same publication, Arne Hole, the general director of the 
Equality Ministry in Norway, said that it would have taken 200 years to reach 40 
percent of female representation on the board. 
However, it is too soon to say that women have become just as eligible for top 
directorship positions as men are. As Farrell and Hersch (2001) noted in their paper on 
gender in the corporate boards, it is still unclear whether the corporate glass ceiling is 
half-empty or half full. In their way to reaching the highest top corporate positions, 
women still have to face a lot of difficulties and impediments which keeps the glass 
ceiling in its place. Looking through the Glass Ceiling is a metaphor meant to conceal 
the fact that it would take more than a gender quota for women to break the glass and 
consider themselves equal to men.  
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VI. Limitations 
 
When estimating firm performance as a function of CEO characteristics, the 
biggest impediment is endogeneity, which could lead to spurious results. According to 
Nyggard’s article (2012) on endogeneity of board structures, the most common forms of 
endogeneity are the omitted variables (such as organizational ability, the CEO status – 
founder or the sole insider of the board), and simultaneity (do poorly performing firms 
hire female CEOs or do the female CEOs negatively influence the performance of the 
firm?). A more complex study on female representation at the CEO level and its 
influence on firm performance would have dealt with endogeneity issues by 
implementing empirical methods such as fixed effects panel estimation or instrumental 
variables. In order to test the hypotheses about the population regression, one must 
make the necessary assumptions for testing hypotheses (e.g., normality, independence). 
A more rigorous robustness check would have verified for violations of the assumptions 
by using the residuals (the difference between the observed and predicted values).  
It is important to stress that the interpretation of results does not depend on the 
centralization power of the CEO, nor on the managers’ less visible characteristics, 
which comprise of educational, functional and occupational background, industry 
experience, and organisational membership. Even though these particular characteristics 
are not of main interest in this study, there is evidence (Deszo and Ross 2008) that firms 
with women in CEO positions have on average worse performances than firms led by 
men. These negative results may occur because women fail to nurture as CEOs or 
because positive results are unnoticeable due of countervailing factors. A deeper insight 
into women’s style of leadership and into their inner characteristics that make them 
different from men would probably give more answers to how women led companies 
function.  
Over the years, researchers have tried to identify and essentialize women’s 
unique management skills. However, it is still not known enough about the Alpha or 
Elite women (Barnard 2006): how they strived in their way of reaching the top, how 
they faced difficulties and how they kept their determination in the face of failure, the 
role of their family and peer support, the impact of money, of values, of chance, and 
timing. Whether women are truly effective as CEOs over the long run, and, if so, under 
what circumstances are questions that must await future research.  
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Appendix 
 
Graph 1. Number of Norwegian PLC firms, by year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The X axis presents the time expressed in years, while the Y axis represents the average number of 
Norwegian PLC firms. The graph shows the evolution of the number of Norwegian PLC firms throughout 
the time interval 2000-2009. The number of firms varies in every year, as firms may die, merge or change 
their corporate form.  
 
Graph 2. Total number of Norwegian LTD firms, 2000-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows the evolution of the number on LTD firms over the time interval 2000-2009. A 
sudden increase in the number of LTD firms can be observed from 2005 onwards, the year in which the 
Norwegian quota was mandated.  
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Graph 3. Female director representation across different types of firms 
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Notes: The X axis represents the time, and the Y axis represents the average percentage of female 
representation in the board of directors. It can be observed that in 2008 all the firms that were subject to 
the Norwegian quota met the law (they made their board of directors being consisted by women in a 
percentage of 40%). However, it is of interest to notice that after the deadline for meeting the quota had 
passed, the ratio of female directors slightly decreased in 2009 to approximately 38% for the PLC 
companies. 
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Table 1. Director characteristics, all Norwegian PLCs, 2000-2009 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 
Average age of CEOs, separately by gender 
Men 55.7 55.4 55.3 54.7 54.4 53.2 52.3 51.3 51.2 50.7 
Women 52.8 52.1 51.2 51.8 52 50.7 49.7 50.4 50.4 50 
           
           
Is CEO a board member, separately by gender 
Men .29 .29 .29 .32 .26 .28 .24 .15 .17 .16 
Women .28 .27 .31 .44 .36 .30 .30 .30 .17 .32 
           
           
Average ratio of firms with a female CEO, and with a male CEO, respectively    
Male CEO 95.4 95.1 95.1 96.4 96.7 94.7 95.5 94.7 93.2 92.7 
Female 
CEO 
          
4.6 4.9 4.9 3.6 3.3 5.3 4.5 5.3 6.8 7.3 
           
           
Average number of directors, separately by gender 
Men 4.97 4.72 4.79 4.8 4.33 4.38 3.98 3.59 3.23 3.26 
Women .28 .38 .44 .46 .93 .86 1.15 1.70 2.17 2.10 
           
           
Average ratio of directors, separately by gender 
Men  95.63 93.87 93.01 92.66 84.39 86.21 79.41 68.86 60.12 61.38 
Women 4.37 6.13 6.99 7.34 15.61 13.79 20.59 31.14 39.88 38.62 
           
           
Average CEO ownership, separately by gender 
Men 19.95 22.11 22.53 20.10 19.23 31.43 23.63 37.21 33.03 26.24 
Women N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
           
           
Average CEO salary (annual mil NOK), separately by gender 
Men 1.089 1.224 1.321 1.301 1.520 1.508 1.829 2.239 2.293 2.256 
Women 0.900 1.172 1.129 1.258 1.247 1.301 1.054 3.142 3.457 3.138 
           
           
Number of PLC firms 
Listed 162 157 145 132 141 154 154 171 168 149 
Not listed 416 412 376 357 319 292 296 213 175 158 
           
Total 578 569 521 489 460 446 450 384 343 307 
Notes: The table reports cross-sectional mean values for director characteristics based on all PLC firms 
registered in Norway for each year from 2000 to 2009, separately by gender. Is CEO a board member is a 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the CEO is a board member and 0 otherwise. The average ratio of 
gender diversity counts for the proportion of firms that have a female CEO, and the proportion of PLC 
firms that have a male CEO. The average number of directors reports the average board size for each 
firm, separately by gender. The average ratio of directors represents the percentage of female and men 
directors with respect to the total size of the board. Average CEO ownership is represented in percentage 
points and shows the amount of the CEO’s stake in the firm. N/A stands for Not Available.   
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Tabel 2. Director characteristics, all Norwegian LTDs, 2000-2009 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
 
Average age of CEOs, separately by gender 
Men 59.1 58.4 57.5 56.7 56 55.1 54.3 53.5 52.8 52.2 
Women 56.5 55.7 54.8 53.9 53.1 52 51.3 50.5 49.9 49.2 
           
           
Is CEO a board member, separately by gender 
Men .80 .81 .80 .80 .82 .78 .80 .80 .81 .81 
Women .69 .70 .70 .68 .71 .68 .69 .69 .70 .69 
           
           
Average ratio of firms with a female CEO, and with a male CEO, respectively   
Male CEO 87.6 87.5 87.3 86.9 86.6 86.4 86.3 86.2 86.1 85.8 
Female 
CEO 
12.4 12.5 12.7 13.1 13.4 13.6 13.7 13.8 13.9 14.2 
          
           
           
Average number of directors, separately by gender 
Men 1.973 1.9352 1.9637 1.9616 1.908 1.911 1.818 1.802 1.7875 1.776 
Women .34 .34 .35 .36 .38 .37 .36 .36 .37 .37 
           
           
Average ratio of directors, separately by gender 
Men  86.18 85.89 85.70 85.56 84.86 84.98 84.90 84.79 84.60 84.46 
Women 13.82 14.11 14.30 14.44 15.14 15.02 15.10 15.21 15.40 15.54 
           
           
Average CEO ownership, separately by gender 
Men 63.89 64.008 63.992 64.27 64.66 67.72 69.81 72.11 72.7 73.12 
Women 60.6 60.9 60.86 61.169 61.39 63.40 64.53 66.79 67.22 67.64 
           
           
Average CEO salary (annual mil NOK), separately by gender 
Men 0.339 0.359 0.375 0.385 0.398 0.422 0.456 0.493 0.535 0.543 
Women 0.237 0.254 0.266 0.282 0.294 0.305 0.328 0.352 0.381 0.397 
           
           
Number of LTD firms 
Total 135,562 138,176 140,625 141,502 143,966 157,264 180,259 191,627 197,648 199,889 
 
Notes: The table reports cross-sectional mean values for director characteristics based on all LTD firms 
registered in Norway for each year from 2000 to 2009, separately by gender. Is CEO a board member is a 
variable which takes the value of 1 if the CEO is a board member and 0 otherwise. The average ratio of 
gender diversity counts for the proportion of LTD firms that have a female CEO, and the proportion of 
firms that have a male CEO. The average number of directors reports the average board size for each 
firm, separately by gender. The average ratio of directors represents the percentage of female and men 
directors with respect to the total size of the board. Average CEO ownership is represented in percentage 
points and shows the amount of the CEO’s stake in the firm.  
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Graph 4. Estimated marginal means of the number of female directors across different 
groups of firms 
 
Notes: The types of the companies are represented on the X-axis (AS (LTD) on the left and ASA (PLC) 
on the right) and the listing status groups are represented by different lines (blue line-the company is not 
listed, and green line-the company is listed). The graph shows that among the ASA group, the listed firms 
have, on average, more women on the board of directors. In contrast, the non-listed firms among the ASA 
group have, on average, fewer women on the board of directors. This can be observed by looking at the 
difference between the two lines. The steep green line goes from zero (no listed AS companies to 
approximately 1.4 estimated marginal mean for female directors for ASA companies). The blue line is 
less steep as the non-listed companies had been less affected by the Norwegian quota. The presence of a 
significant interaction is reflected in the graph above since the lines of the chart are clearly not parallel. 
However, further testing is needed to know if this difference is significant.  
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Graph 5. Average number of female directors across AS and ASA firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The graph is a result of one-way ANOVA testing analysis for the difference in means. The value 
for F (<0.05) is significant and shows that the difference in mean of female directors is significant within 
these particular groups of firms (ASA and AS). The graph also shows that the average number of female 
directors is higher in the ASA group than in the AS group.  
 
Graph 6. Average number of female directors across listed and non-listed firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The difference in mean of female directors is significant within the listing status group. The graph 
also shows that the number of female directors is higher when the company is listed. 
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Graph 7. Average ratio of directors for all PLC firms, separately by gender 
Notes: The X axis presents the time expressed in years, while the Y axis represents the average ratio of 
directors, separately by gender (for example, the ratio of female directors is calculated as the ratio 
between female directors and the total number of directors on the board).  The graph shows the time 
series of the transformation in the composition of Norwegian board of directors for all PLC firms. The 
distance between the two lines on the graph is decreasing, showing the desired trend of bringing equality 
among sexes on the board level. 
 
Graph 8. Average ratio of directors for all LTD firms, separately by gender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The graph shows the distribution of the directors by gender in the time interval of 2000 – 2009 for 
all LTD firms. The average ratio of directors is calculated separately for each gender by dividing the 
number of male directors by the total number of directors, and the number of female directors by the total 
number of directors on the board. Unlike the PLC group of firms, the LTD group has less women 
representation on the board of directors. For the LTD group, women are not represented on the board in a 
proportion more than 15.54% (2009). Unlike the graph from the PLC group, for the LTD group the two 
lines, representing the two sexes maintain a relatively constant distance from each other along the whole 
time interval. 
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Graph 9. Average age of CEOs for all PLC firms, separately by gender 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The X axis represents the timeline and the Y axis represents the mean age of CEOs, separately by 
gender. The graph shows a convergence between the mean age of a male CEO and the mean age of a 
female CEO (both of which could be promoted as CEOs at the mean age of 50).  
 
Graph 10. Distribution of PLCs’ female CEOs 
Note: Percentage of female CEOs represents the proportion of women CEOs expressed in percentage 
points with regard to the total number of CEOs registered in the respective year for all PLC Norwegian 
firms. It can be observed that from 2006 onwards, female representation on CEO level had been 
increasing reaching a top of 7.3% representation in 2009.  
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Graph 11. Female CEO representation across different types of firms 
 
Notes: The percentage of female CEOs represents the proportion of women CEOs expressed in 
percentage points with regard to the total number of CEOs registered in the respective year for the 
respective category of firm (PLC listed and non-listed, and LTD). For example, in 2000 there were 
registered only 4 female CEOs for the listed PLCs, representing 2.6% of the total CEOs registered in 
2000 (97.4% of the CEOs being represented by men). Observation: the missing values are not taken into 
consideration.  
 
Graph 12. Distribution of CEOs according to gender and groups of firms 
Notes: The percentage of female CEOs represents the proportion of women CEOs expressed in 
percentage points with regard to the total number of CEOs registered in the respective panel during the 
whole sample period. The highest representation of female CEOs can be observed in the LTD group 
(13.4%) and also in the non-listed PLCs (5.9%) group, while in the other two groups (listed PLCs and all 
PLCs) female representation on the CEO level is less than 5%.  
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Graph 13. Distribution of CEOs by gender for all the Norwegian PLCs by year 
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Notes: The percentage of female CEOs represents the proportion of women CEOs expressed in 
percentage points with regard to the total number of CEOs registered in the respective year.  
 
Table 3. Correlations between the CEO gender with various variables for all PLC firms  
 
                                    Correlation of CEO gender with:  
Year 1. Nr. of female 
directors 
2. Nr. of personal 
female owners 
3. Aggregated 
fraction held by 
female owners 
 Value Sig. Value Sig. Value Sig. 
2005 .124** .026 -.033 .305 -.027 .339 
2006 .109** .044 -.018 .394 -.017 .399 
2007 -.03 .335 -.023 .377 -.021 .384 
2008 .018 .408 -.026 .366 -.023 .38 
2009 -.08 .156 -.027 .37 -.024 .384 
** statistically significant at p < .05, two-tailed 
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Graph 14. Clustered bar chart of CEO gender and CEO age for all Norwegian PLCs 
prior-quota (2000-2004) 
 
Notes: The Y axis shows the annual salary expressed in mil NOK and the X axis represents age groups for 
CEOs for all PLC firms during the prior-quota period (2000-2004). The Y axis reference line represents 
the average salary reference line (1.1895 mil NOK).  
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Graph 15. Clustered bar chart of CEO gender and CEO age for all Norwegian PLCs 
post quota (2005-2009) 
 
Notes: The Y axis shows the annual salary expressed in mil NOK and the X axis represents age groups for 
CEOs for all PLC firms during the post-quota period (2005-2009). The Y axis reference line represents 
the average annual salary reference line (2.0621 mil NOK) which had approximately doubled in 
comparison with the average annual salary for the prior-quota period.  
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Table 4. Distribution of CEO by gender (%) according to industry sectors for all 
Norwegian firms (2000-2007) NACE rev 1 
 
Industry 
sector 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
         
A. Agriculture, hunting and forestry 
Male  91.1 92.2 92.4 92.9 92.4 91.1 90.5 90.3 
Female 8.9 7.8 7.6 7.1 7.6 8.9 9.5 9.7 
         
         
B. Fishing 
Male  94.9 94.4 94.4 93.4 93.2 93.4 93.3 94 
Female 5.1 5.6 5.6 6.6 6.8 6.6 6.7 6 
         
         
C. Mining and quarrying 
Male  92.5 93.3 92.4 95.1 93.9 95 95.3 94.5 
Female 7.5 6.7 7.6 4.9 6.1 5 4.7 5.5 
         
         
D. Manufacturing 
Male  92.1 91.9 91.8 91.9 91.8 91.5 91.1 90.8 
Female 7.9 8.1 8.2 8.1 8.2 8.5 8.9 9.2 
         
         
E. Electricity, gas and water supply 
Male  96.9 97.3 95.9 95.6 95.9 95.3 95 92.5 
Female 3.1 2.7 4.1 4.4 4.1 4.7 5 4.8 
         
         
F. Construction 
Male  97.8 97.6 97.7 97.8 97.8 97.7 97.7 97.5 
Female 2.2 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.5 
         
         
G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household 
goods 
Male  83.2 82.7 82.9 81.8 81.5 80.5 80 79.7 
Female 16.8 17.3 17.1 18.2 18.5 19.5 20 20.3 
         
         
H. Hotels and restaurants 
Male  76.6 76.6 76.3 74.7 75 74.6 73.4 73 
Female 23.4 23.4 23.7 5.3 25 25.4 26.6 27 
         
         
I. Transport, storage and communication 
Male  92.9 92.4 92.1 92 91.7 91.3 90.8 90.8 
Female 7.1 7.6 7.9 8 8.3 8.8 9.2 9.2 
         
         
J. Financial intermediation 
Male  93.6 91.6 91.7 90.7 89.6 89.4 88.4 88.5 
Female 6.4 8.4 8.3 9.3 10.4 10.6 11.6 11.5 
         
         
K. Real estate, renting and business activities 
Male  89.1 88.9 88.9 88.7 88.4 88.4 88.4 88.6 
Female 10.9 11.1 11.1 11.3 11.6 11.6 11.6 11.4 
         
         
L. Public administration and defense; compulsory social security 
Male  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 50 
Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 
         
         
M. Education 
Male  83.2 83 81.3 82.7 81.9 79.8 80.5 78.4 
Female 16.8 17 18.7 17.3 18.1 20.2 19.5 21.6 
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Table 4 continued 
 
Industry 
sector 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
         
N. Health and social work 
Male  74.9 74.5 74.4 71.1 70.4 67.6 66.1 64 
Female 25.1 25.5 25.6 28.9 29.6 32.4 33.9 36 
         
         
O. Other community, social and personal service activities 
Male  69.6 68.8 69.2 67.6 67 66.3 64.9 64.4 
Female 30.4 31.2 30.8 32.4 33 33.7 35.1 35.6 
         
         
P. Private households with employed persons 
Male  0 0 0 100 100 100 100 100 
Female 100 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 
         
         
Q. Extra-territorial organizations and bodies 
Male  100 100 100 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Female 0 0 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
Table 5. Distribution of CEO by gender (%) according to industry sectors for all PLC 
firms (2000-2007) 
 
Industry 
sector 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
         
A. Agriculture, hunting and forestry 
Male  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Female N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
         
         
B. Fishing 
Male  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 87.5 
Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12.5 
         
         
C. Mining and quarrying 
Male  100 100 100 100 100 93.8 100 100 
Female 0 0 0 0 0 6.3 0 0 
         
         
D. Manufacturing 
Male  94 95.3 94.6 95.5 96.8 95.5 94.8 96.7 
Female 6 4.7 5.4 4.5 3.2 4.5 5.2 3.3 
         
         
E. Electricity, gas and water supply 
Male  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
         
         
F. Construction 
Male  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Female 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
         
         
G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household 
goods 
Male  92.7 90.3 92.9 100 95.2 95.7 86.7 94.4 
Female 7.3 9.7 7.1 0 4.8 4.3 13.3 5.6 
         
         
H. Hotels and restaurants 
Male  100 100 100 100 100 N/A N/A 100 
Female 0 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A 0 
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Table 5 continued 
Industry 
sector 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
         
I. Transport, storage and communication 
Male  90.2 88.2 92.6 92.3 94.4 93.8 92.6 89.7 
Female 9.8 11.8 7.4 7.7 5.6 6.3 7.4 10.3 
         
         
J. Financial intermediation 
Male  97.9 97.7 97.3 97.2 97 96 93.4 91.9 
Female 2.1 2.3 2.7 2.8 3 4 6.6 8.1 
         
         
K. Real estate, renting and business activities 
Male  96.2 95.4 95.7 95.4 96.1 93.9 95.9 95.7 
Female 3.8 4.6 4.3 4.6 3.9 6.1 4.1 4.3 
         
         
L. Public administration and defense; compulsory social security 
Male  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Female N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
         
         
M. Education 
Male  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Female N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
         
         
N. Health and social work 
Male  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Female N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
         
         
O. Other community, social and personal service activities 
Male  94.7 94.4 93.3 100 100 83.3 100 100 
Female 5.3 5.6 6.7 0 0 16.7 0 0 
         
         
P. Private households with employed persons 
Male  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Female N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
         
         
Q. Extra-territorial organizations and bodies 
Male  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Female N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Notes: The distribution of firms among various sections was based on NACE rev 1 classification as in the 
table below. 
Section NACE rev 1 industry sections Divisions 
A Agriculture, hunting and forestry 01-02 
B Fishing 05 
C Mining and quarrying 10-14 
D Manufacturing 15-37 
E Electricity, gas and water supply 40-41 
F Construction 45 
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles 
and personal and household goods 
50-52 
H Hotels and restaurants 55 
I Transport, storage and communication 60-64 
J Financial intermediation 65-67 
K Real estate, renting and business activities 70-74 
L Public administration and defense; compulsory social security 75 
M Education 80 
N Health and social work 85 
O Other community, social and personal service activities 90-93 
P Private households with employed persons 95 
Q Extra-territorial organizations and bodies 99 
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Graph 16. Distribution of % female CEOs across different industry sectors for all 
Norwegian firms 2000-2007 (NACE rev 1) 
 
Distribution of % female CEOs across different industry sectors for 
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Notes: The values in the pie chart are approximate. The pie chart over the 2000-2007 time period was 
determined as an average of the percentage of female CEOs in each industry sector for each year.  
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Graph 18. Distribution of female CEOs across selected industry sectors for al PLC firms 
by year 
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Notes: The X axis represents the timeline and the Y axis represents women representation on CEO level 
for all Norwegian PLC firms for selected industry sectors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking through the Glass Ceiling. Women and Power: Leadership in Norwegian Firms 
 - 64 - 
 
Table 6. Distribution of CEO by gender (%) according to industry sectors for all 
Norwegian firms (2008-2009) NACE rev 2 
 
Industry 2008 2009 Industry 2008 2009 
      
A. Agriculture, forestry and fishing  K. Financial and insurance activities 
Male 90.3 92 Male 88.3 88.2 
Female 9.7 8 Female 11.7 11.8 
      
      
B. Mining and quarrying L. Real estate activities 
Male 93.9 95.4 Male N/A 89.1 
Female 6.1 4.6 Female N/A 10.9 
      
      
C. Manufacturing M. Professional, scientific and technical 
activities 
Male 90.3 91 Male 88.6 84.3 
Female 9.7 9 Female 11.4 15.7 
      
      
D. Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning 
supply 
N. Administrative and support service 
activities 
Male 95.4 94.6 Male 76.9 84.1 
Female 4.6 5.4 Female 23.1 15.9 
      
      
E. Water supply; sewerage, waste 
management and remediation activities 
O. Public administration and defense; 
compulsory social security 
Male 88.1 94.7 Male N/A 50 
Female 11.9 5.3 Female N/A 50 
      
      
F. Construction P. Education 
Male 97.8 96.7 Male 62.6 75.1 
Female 2.2 3.3 Female 37.4 24.9 
      
      
G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 
Q. Human health and social work activities 
   
Male 97.5 79.3 Male 88.2 63 
Female 2.5 20.7 Female 11.8 37 
      
      
H. Transportation and storage R. Arts, entertainment and recreation 
Male 79.8 93.6 Male 63.6 76.4 
Female 20.2 6.4 Female 36.4 23.6 
      
      
I. Accommodation and food service activities S. Other service activities 
Male 72.1 71.9 Male 100 40 
Female 27.9 28.1 Female 0 60 
      
      
J. Information and communication T. Activities of households as employees 
Male 90.4 90.6 Male N/A 100 
Female 9.6 9.4 Female N/A 0 
      
      
 U. Activities of extraterritorial organizations 
and bodies 
   Male N/A N/A 
   Female N/A N/A 
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Table 7. Distribution of CEO by gender (%) according to industry sectors for all PLC 
firms (2008-2009) NACE rev 2 
 
Industry 2008 2009 Industry 2008 2009 
      
A. Agriculture, forestry and fishing  K. Financial and insurance activities 
Male N/A N/A Male 90.5 92.3 
Female N/A N/A Female 9.5 7.7 
      
      
B. Mining and quarrying L. Real estate activities 
Male 88.9 95.5 Male N/A 72.7 
Female 11.1 4.5 Female N/A 27.3 
      
      
C. Manufacturing M. Professional, scientific and technical 
activities 
Male 97.3 96 Male 90.3 96.6 
Female 2.7 4 Female 9.7 3.4 
      
      
D. Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning 
supply 
N. Administrative and support service 
activities 
Male 88.9 100 Male N/A 81.8 
Female 11.1 0 Female N/A 18.2 
      
      
E. Water supply; sewerage, waste 
management and remediation activities 
O. Public administration and defense; 
compulsory social security 
Male 100 N/A Male N/A N/A 
Female 0 N/A Female N/A N/A 
      
      
F. Construction P. Education 
Male N/A 75 Male N/A N/A 
Female N/A 25 Female N/A N/A 
      
      
G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 
Q. Human health and social work activities 
   
Male 100 100 Male N/A N/A 
Female 0 0 Female N/A N/A 
      
      
H. Transportation and storage R. Arts, entertainment and recreation 
Male 93.3 82.6 Male 100 100 
Female 6.7 17.4 Female 0 0 
      
      
I. Accommodation and food service activities S. Other service activities 
Male 100 N/A Male N/A N/A 
Female 0 N/A Female N/A N/A 
      
      
J. Information and communication T. Activities of households as employees 
Male 87.5 87 Male N/A N/A 
Female 12.5 13 Female N/A N/A 
      
      
 U. Activities of extraterritorial organizations 
and bodies 
   Male N/A N/A 
   Female N/A N/A 
      
Notes: The distribution of firms among different industry sections was based on the NACE rev 2 
classifications according to the following table.  
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Section NACE rev 2 industry sections Divisions 
A Agriculture, forestry and fishing  01 – 03 
B Mining and quarrying  05 – 09 
C Manufacturing  10 – 33 
D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply  35 
E Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation 
activities  
36 – 39 
F Construction  41 – 43 
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles  
45 – 47 
H Transportation and storage  49 – 53 
I Accommodation and food service activities  55 – 56 
J Information and communication  58 – 63 
K Financial and insurance activities  64 – 66 
L Real estate activities  68 
M Professional, scientific and technical activities  69 – 75 
N Administrative and support service activities  77 – 82 
O Public administration and defense; compulsory social security  84 
P Education  85 
Q Human health and social work activities  86 – 88 
R Arts, entertainment and recreation  90 – 93 
S Other service activities  94 – 96 
T Activities of households as employers; u0ndifferentiated goods- 
and services-producing activities of households for own use 
97 – 98 
U Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies  99 
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Table 8. Summary statistics, PLC firms 2000-2009 
 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
Panel A. Listed PLCs 
Nr. of female CEOs 45     
Nr. of male CEOs 1450     
Nr. of female directors 1526   1.45 1.211 
Ratio of female 
directors 
1526   .2199 .17335 
Aggregated fraction 
held by female owners  
1477   .0687 1.26509 
Board size 1526   6.32 1.803 
Company age 1450   28.42 35.255 
Nr. of female owners 1477   .01 .119 
Panel B. Non-listed PLCs 
Nr. of female CEOs 168     
Nr. of male CEOs 2662     
Nr. of female directors 2964   .66 .933 
Ratio of female 
directors 
2964   .1326 .17477 
Aggregated fraction 
held by female owners 
2752   .5952 5.39553 
Board size 2964   4.69 1.732 
Company age 2819   12.05 20.764 
Nr. of female owners 2752   .04 .238 
 
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for all PLCs over the time interval 2000-2009, separately for 
listed and non-listed PLCs. Ratio of female directors represents the number of female directors divided by 
the total number of directors. Aggregated fraction held by female owners shows the total stake owned by 
women owners expressed in percentage points. Firm age is the current year minus the foundation year. 
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Table 9. Summary statistics, LTD firms 2000-2009 
 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. 
Nr. of female CEOs 173198   
Nr. of male CEOs 1117937   
Nr. of female directors 1599177 .36 .660 
Ratio of female 
directors 
1599177 .1489 .27931 
Aggregated fraction 
held by female owners 
1512429 11.2561 25.95524 
Board size 1599177 2.23 1.378 
Company age 1546677 10.57 12.542 
Nr. of female owners 1512480 .28 .624 
 
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for all LTDs over the time interval 2000-2009, separately for 
listed and non-listed PLCs. Ratio of female directors represents the number of female directors divided by 
the total number of directors. Aggregated fraction held by female owners shows the total stake owned by 
women owners expressed in percentage points. Firm age is the current year minus the foundation year. 
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Table 10. Binomial logit model for the prior quota period (2000 - 2004) 
 
Table 10’. Binomial logit model for the prior quota period (2000 - 2004) – Coefficient for number of female directors 
A. Listed PLCs B. Non-listed PLCs 
 Coefficient p-value Exp(B)  Coefficient p-value Exp(B) 
Nr of female 
directors 
   Nr of female 
directors 
   
3.273** .043 26.381 .870*** .000 2.386 
Notes: Table 10’ shows the results for the coefficient of the number of female directors by running the following regression: CEO gender = β*number of female directors + Σ control 
variables + ε. 
 
A. Listed PLCs B. Non-listed PLCs 
        
Dependent variable: CEO gender  Dependent variable: CEO gender  
Observations  358  Observations  848  
Cox and Snell R2 .053  Cox and Snell R2 .032  
Nagelkerke R2 .569 Sig. Nagelkerke R2 .11 Sig.  
Model Chi-square 19.327*** .002 Model Chi-square 27.57*** .000 
        
 Coefficient p-value Exp(B)  Coefficient p-value Exp(B) 
        
Independent variable   Independent variable   
Ratio of female 
directors 
   Ratio of female 
directors 
   
16.785** .044 1.949E7 4.7507*** .000 115.600 
        
Control variables   Control variables   
Firm age .081* .064 1.085 Firm age .004 .717 1.004 
Firm size 1.304 .240 3.682 Firm size -.119 .142 .888 
Board size -4.643* .083 .010 Board size -.193 .123 .825 
ROA -.039* .086 .962 ROA .000 .545 .999 
Intercept -13.327 .348 .000 Intercept -.886 .479 .412 
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Notes: Observations represent the number of cases included in the analysis. Some cases are deleted from the analysis where information is missing. Only cases where all dependent 
and explanatory variables are complete are included in the analysis.  
The Cox and Snell R2 is R2 = 1 – [L(0)/L(B)]2/N where L(0) is the likelihood for the model with only a constant, L(B) is the likelihood for the model under consideration, and N is the 
sample size. This measure for logistic regression cannot achieve a maximum value of 1. Nagelkerke (1991) proposed a modification of the Cox and Snell R2 so that the value of 1 
could be achieved. The Nagelkerke R2 is: R2 = R2/ R2MAX whereR
2
MAX = 1- [L(0)]
 2/N. Nagelkerke R2 tells how much of the variation in the outcome variable is explained by the 
logistic regression model. (Observation: The values of logistic summary measures are typically much smaller than the ones from a linear regression model).  
Model chi-square is the difference between -2LL for the model with only a constant and -2LL for the current model. The model chi-square tests the null hypothesis that all 
coefficients except the constant are zero. This is comparable to the overall F test for regression (Norusis 2008). 
Exp(B) gives the relative odds or odds ratio for a particular explanatory variable, given the other explanatory variables in the model. 
p-value represents the significance level 
* statistically significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) 
** statistically significant at the 5% level (p<0.05) 
*** statistically significant at the 1% level (p<0.01) 
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Table 10’’. Binomial logit model for the prior quota period (2000 - 2004) – Coefficient for number of female directors 
C. All PLCs D. All LTDs 
 Coefficient p-value Exp(B)  Coefficient p-value Exp(B) 
Nr of female 
directors 
   Nr of female 
directors 
   
.777*** .000 2.176 2.318*** .000 10.160 
Notes: Table 10’’ shows the results for the coefficient of the number of female directors by running the following regression: CEO gender = β*number of female directors + Σ 
control variables + ε. 
Table 10.  Binomial logit model for the prior quota period (2000 - 2004) continued 
C. All PLCs D. All LTDs 
        
Dependent variable: CEO gender  Dependent variable: CEO gender  
Observations  1206  Observations  360288  
Cox and Snell R2 .03  Cox and Snell R2 .228  
Nagelkerke R2 .121 Sig. Nagelkerke R2 .415 Sig. 
Model Chi-square 36.125*** .000 Model Chi-square 93071.193*** .000 
        
 Coefficient p-value Exp(B)  Coefficient p-value Exp(B) 
        
Independent variable   Independent variable   
Ratio of female 
directors 
   Ratio of female 
directors 
   
4.543*** .000 93.975 4.812*** .000 122.961 
        
Control variables   Control variables   
Firm age .008 .289 1.008 Firm age -.011*** .000 .989 
Firm size -.096 .201 .908 Firm size -.048*** .000 .954 
Board size -.385*** .001 .681 Board size .023*** .000 1.023 
ROA .000 .428 .999 ROA .000*** .000 1.000 
Intercept -.646 .588 .524 Intercept -2.368*** .000 .094 
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Table 11’. Binomial logit model for the post quota period (2005 - 2009) – Coefficient for number of female directors 
A. Listed PLCs B. Non-listed PLCs 
 Coefficient p-value Exp(B)  Coefficient p-value Exp(B) 
Nr of female 
directors 
   Nr of female 
directors 
   
2.354*** .001 10.523 1.114*** .000 3.047 
Notes: Table 11’ shows the results for the coefficient of the number of female directors by running the following regression: CEO gender = β*number of female directors + Σ control 
variables + ε 
Table 11. Binomial logit model for the post quota period (2005 - 2009)  
A. Listed PLCs B. Non-listed PLCs 
        
Dependent variable: CEO gender  Dependent variable: CEO gender  
Observations  482  Observations  524  
Cox and Snell R2 .09  Cox and Snell R2 .039  
Nagelkerke R2 .388 Sig. Nagelkerke R2 .098 Sig. . 
Model Chi-square 45.243*** .000 Model Chi-square 20.599*** .01 
        
 Coefficient p-value Exp(B)  Coefficient p-value Exp(B) 
        
Independent variable   Independent variable   
Ratio of female 
directors 
   Ratio of female 
directors 
4.156*** .000 63.831 
12.344*** .001 229532.092    
        
Control variables   Control variables   
Firm age .032*** .000 1.033 Firm age -.005 .691 .995 
Firm size -.269** .012 .764 Firm size .024 .784 1.025 
Board size -.078 .675 .925 Board size -.111 .369 .895 
ROA .015 .591 1.015 ROA .005 .393 1.005 
Intercept -5.078** .027 .006 Intercept -3.750
** .012 .024 
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Table 11’’. Binomial logit model for the post quota period (2005 - 2009) – Coefficient for number of female directors 
C. All PLCs D. All LTDs 
 Coefficient p-value Exp(B)  Coefficient p-value Exp(B) 
Nr of female 
directors 
   Nr of female 
directors 
   
1.209*** .000 3.349 2.305*** .000 10.020 
Notes: Table 11’’ shows the results for the coefficient of the number of female directors by running the following regression: CEO gender = β*number of female directors + Σ 
control variables + ε. 
Table 11. Binomial logit model for the post quota period (2005 - 2009) continued  
C. All PLCs D. All LTDs 
        
Dependent variable: CEO gender  Dependent variable: CEO gender  
Observations  1006  Observations  479710  
Cox and Snell R2 .046  Cox and Snell R2 .246  
Nagelkerke R2 .141 Sig. Nagelkerke R2 .429 Sig. 
Model Chi-square 47.562*** .000 Model Chi-square 135757.028*** .000 
        
 Coefficient p-value Exp(B)  Coefficient p-value Exp(B) 
        
Independent variable   Independent variable   
Ratio of female 
directors 
   Ratio of female 
directors 
   
4.551*** .000 94.713 4.757*** .000 116.386 
        
Control variables   Control variables   
Firm age .017*** .000 1.017 Firm age -.012
*** .000 .988 
Firm size -.100 .102 .905 Firm size -.040*** .000 .961 
Board size -.318*** .002 .728 Board size .002 .626 1.002 
ROA .010* .093 1.010 ROA .000*** .000 1.000 
Intercept -1.625 .118 .197 Intercept -2.309*** .000 .099 
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Table 12. OLS regressions prior quota (2000 - 2004) 
Dependant 
variables 
A. Listed PLC firms B. Non-listed PLC firms 
Return on 
Assets 
R2 .086 Observations 132 R2 .094 Observations 384 
Durbin-Watson 1.991 F test 1.666 Durbin-Watson 1.602 F test 5.569*** 
   Sig. .123   Sig. .000 
 Independent variables Standardized p-value Independent variables Standardized p-value 
 CEO gender  -.168* .069 CEO gender  -.060 .244 
 CEO salary  -.068 .496 CEO salary  -.019 .708 
 CEO age  .229** .019 CEO age  -.043 .403 
 Control variables   Control variables   
 Firm size  .168* .093 Firm size  .287*** .000 
 Firm age  .081 .389 Firm age  -.005 .918 
 Board size  -.129 .211 Board size  -.117** .026 
 Gender diversity .056 .546 Gender diversity .113** .031 
         
Profit-to-
sales ratio 
R2 .181 Observations 132 R2 .102 Observations 384 
Durbin-Watson 1.296 F test 3.911*** Durbin-Watson 2.009 F test 6.12*** 
   Sig. .001   Sig. .000 
 Independent variables Standardized p-value Independent variables Standardized p-value 
 CEO gender  -.067 .439 CEO gender  -.003 .950 
 CEO salary  -.295*** .002 CEO salary  -.101** .050 
 CEO age  -.159* .084 CEO age  -.052 .319 
 Control variables   Control variables   
 Firm size  .220** .021 Firm size  .337*** .000 
 Firm age  .249*** .006 Firm age  .001 .980 
 Board size  .047 .633 Board size  -.056 .286 
 Gender diversity  -.036 .688 Gender diversity  -.126** .016 
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Notes:  The R2 represents the Multiple Squared Correlation and shows how much of the variability in ROA and Profit-to-sales ratio is explained by all independent variables. R2 
is obtained by dividing the regression sum of squares by the total sum of squares. Profit-to-sales ratio shows how many cents of profit are earned on each euro of sales (Sutton 2004, 
51).  
 The Durbin Watson statistic tests whether adjacent residuals are correlated. The possible values of the statistic range from 0 to 4. If the residuals are not correlated with 
each other, the statistic is close to 2. Values less than 2 indicate positive correlation of the residuals, and values greater than 2 indicate negative correlation. Observations represent 
the number of firms that survived along the whole sample. 
 The unstandardized coefficients provide information needed to write the regression equation in raw score units, whereas the standardized coefficients provide information 
needed to express the regression equation in standard score units, or Z-score units. Standardized coefficients are the coefficients obtained if both the dependent variable and each of 
the independent variables have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1. Therefore, the standardized coefficients are useful for comparing the coefficients in the model. The CEO 
gender is a dummy intercept variable that takes a value of 1 if the CEO is a female and a value of 0 if the CEO is a male. The standardized coefficient for CEO gender indicates the 
additional increase or decrease in ROA and profit-to-sales ratio that can be attributed to having a female CEO. 
The overall F test is used for testing the null hypothesis that the population value for R is 0. The observed significance level for the F statistic tells how often it is expected 
to observe a sample value for multiple R of its respective value or larger when the true population value is zero. If the observed significance level is lass than .0005, the null 
hypothesis is rejected. The test that multiple R is zero is equivalent to testing that the population values of all the regression coefficients in the equation except the constant are zero. 
Even if the null hypothesis that the population value for multiple R is 0 is rejected, that does not mean that all of the variables in the equation have regression coefficients that are 
significantly different from 0. To test whether a particular coefficient is 0, I performed t-tests for each coefficient. The observed significance level for testing the null hypothesis that 
in the population the value of the coefficient is 0 is .05. For p-values lower than .05, the null hypothesis is rejected, and for values above .05, the null hypothesis is accepted. 
Gender diversity is represented by the ratio of women on the board of directors.  
 * statistically significant at the 10% level 
 ** statistically significant at the 5% level 
 *** statistically significant at the 1% level 
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Table 12. OLS regressions prior quota (2000 - 2004) continued 
Dependant 
variables 
C. All PLC firms D. All LTD firms 
Return on 
Assets 
R2 .077 Observations 516 R2 .005 Observations 170809 
Durbin-Watson 1.591 F test 6.017*** Durbin-Watson 1.898 F test 125.418*** 
   Sig. .000   Sig. .000 
 Independent variables Standardized p-value Independent variables Standardized p-value 
 CEO gender  -.067 .130 CEO gender  -.006* .061 
 CEO salary  .002 .973 CEO salary  -.002 .546 
 CEO age  -.004 .934 CEO age  .012*** .000 
 Control variables   Control variables   
 Firm size  .249*** .000 Firm size  .073*** .000 
 Firm age  .020 .672 Firm age  -.003 .280 
 Board size  -.114** .016 Board size  -.052*** .000 
 Gender diversity .111** .015 Gender diversity .017*** .000 
         
Profit-to-
sales ratio 
R2 .112 Observations 516 R2 .001 Observations 171026 
Durbin-Watson 1.349 F test 9.188*** Durbin-Watson 1.846 F test 20.792*** 
   Sig. .000   Sig. .000 
 Independent variables Standardized p-value Independent variables Standardized p-value 
 CEO gender  -.016 .708 CEO gender  -.005 .122 
 CEO salary  -.246*** .000 CEO salary  .014*** .000 
 CEO age  -.127*** .004 CEO age  -.001 .746 
 Control variables   Control variables   
 Firm size  .235*** .000 Firm size  -.035*** .000 
 Firm age  .146*** .002 Firm age  .007*** .008 
 Board size  -.003 .952 Board size  .011*** .000 
 Gender diversity  -.073 .101 Gender diversity  .001 .860 
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Table 13. OLS regressions post quota (2005 - 2009)  
Dependant 
variables 
A. Listed PLC firms B. Non-listed PLC firms 
Return on 
Assets 
R2 .164 Observations 107 R2 .172 Observations 188 
Durbin-Watson 1.58 F test 2.774** Durbin-Watson 1.557 F test 5.34*** 
   Sig .011   Sig .000 
 Independent variables Standardized p-value Independent variables Standardized p-value 
 CEO gender  -.077 .475 CEO gender  -.054 .462 
 CEO salary  .213** .040 CEO salary  -.031 .663 
 CEO age  .098 .353 CEO age  .101 .168 
 Control variables   Control variables   
 Firm size  .118 .337 Firm size  .386*** .000 
 Firm age  .181 .122 Firm age  -.040 .608 
 Board size  -.277** .012 Board size  -.171** .028 
 Gender diversity -.195** .047 Gender diversity -.077 .274 
         
Profit-to-
sales ratio 
R2 .486 Observations 107 R2 .19 Observations 191 
Durbin-Watson 1.043 F test 13.364*** Durbin-Watson 2.064 F test 6.138*** 
   Sig .000   Sig .000 
 Independent variables Standardized p-value Independent variables Standardized p-value 
 CEO gender  .588*** .000 CEO gender  .013 .851 
 CEO salary  .173** .033 CEO salary  -.085 .229 
 CEO age  .186** .026 CEO age  -.008 .914 
 Control variables   Control variables   
 Firm size  -.376*** .000 Firm size  .448*** .000 
 Firm age  -.101 .269 Firm age  -.053 .480 
 Board size  .082 .335 Board size  -.028 .717 
 Gender diversity  .031 .679 Gender diversity  -.073 .289 
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Table 13. OLS regressions post quota (2005 - 2009) continued 
Dependant 
variables 
C. All PLC firms D. All LTD firms 
Return on 
Assets 
R2 .141 Observations 295 R2 .004 Observations 181413 
Durbin-Watson 1.525 F test 6.737*** Durbin-Watson 1.884 F test 115.509*** 
   Sig .000   Sig .000 
 Independent variables Standardized p-value Independent variables Standardized p-value 
 CEO gender  -.040 .495 CEO gender  -.004 .132 
 CEO salary  -.009 .876 CEO salary  -.004 .114 
 CEO age  .084 .163 CEO age  .018*** .000 
 Control variables   Control variables   
 Firm size  .320*** .000 Firm size  .069*** .000 
 Firm age  .080 .193 Firm age  -.028*** .000 
 Board size  -.267*** .000 Board size  -.041*** .000 
 Gender diversity -.100* .081 Gender diversity .003 .357 
         
Profit-to-
sales ratio 
R2 .188 Observations 298 R2 .001 Observations 208311 
Durbin-Watson 1.034 F test 9.588*** Durbin-Watson 1.931 F test 29.168*** 
   Sig .000   Sig .000 
 Independent variables Standardized p-value Independent variables Standardized p-value 
 CEO gender  .313*** .000 CEO gender  -.003 .247 
 CEO salary  .134** .021 CEO salary  .015*** .000 
 CEO age  .057 .326 CEO age  -.006** .017 
 Control variables   Control variables   
 Firm size  -.151*** .009 Firm size  -.044*** .000 
 Firm age  .188*** .002 Firm age  .004 .102 
 Board size  -.007 .903 Board size  .015*** .000 
 Gender diversity  -.029 .605 Gender diversity  -.004 .124 
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Abstract 
 
This paper examines whether there is a relationship between the CEO gender of 
Norwegian firms and firm performance. In other words, the main question the paper raises is 
if women-led companies are distinguishable in any detectable and relevant way. I examine the 
influence of women in the executive suite across different samples of firms: AS, ASA and 
listed ones.  
Results show that there is no significant improvement of firm performance in 
Norwegian firms. Nevertheless, the findings also show that the aggregated fraction held by 
female owners is positively correlated with the gender of the CEO, leading to more female 
power in Norwegian firms. There is no relevant evidence that there is a significant 
relationship between firm performance and CEO’s characteristics. If female participation in 
the board of the company has a positive effect on firm performance, results show that having 
a woman CEO has a neutral or negative effect.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The objective of this paper is to analyze the particular source of diversity in corporate 
governance and top management, namely that attributable to the participation of women. The 
issue of gender diversity has been discussed both in the academic literature and in the popular 
press. Among numerous aspects connected to the issue, recent studies have investigated the 
so-called “glass ceiling effect1” that refers to obstacles women have to face in their way of 
reaching the highest levels of power in top management.  
The resilience of the glass ceiling can be accounted for in many ways. Whether the 
concept is highlighted as the “semi-hard glass ceiling” (Agrawal and Knoeber 2001) or the 
“ultimate glass ceiling” (Arfken at al., 2004), women feel that as further as they climb on the 
higher levels of management the more intense they sense a sort of male brotherhood from 
which they are excluded. At the executive level, the glass ceiling apparently persists.  
Therefore, it is important to measure women’s participation in executive suite in 
financial terms. It is a challenge to try and commensurate the impact that women have both on 
corporate policies and on corporate finance. Not only is performance measured in various 
ways, but women’s contribution to firm performance is also quantified by numerous factors 
(experience, background, motivation, and others). Some papers measure firm performance by 
normal stock-market returns, ROI (return on investment), or CAR (cumulative abnormal 
returns). In my paper, I will measure performance by ROA (Return on Assets) and ROE 
(Return on Equity).  
Most companies are founded by an individual who is likely to be both the owner and 
the manager. The manager and the CEO remain in charge of their businesses as they grow, 
being responsible for their direction and their management (Cadbury 2002).  
Executives can affect firm outcomes as they can consistently influence key decisions 
in their firms. Therefore, I believe it is important to analyze the connection between firm 
performance and CEO’s characteristics and examine whether there are strong some 
relationships among the factors.  
Furthermore, the paper examines the extent to which women have vanquished the 
glass ceiling by empirically analysing if there has been an increase in women’s representation 
in CEO positions. Therefore, it is important to discuss policies currently implemented in some 
countries and organizations to foster the advancement of women in business. Norway is one 
                                                 
1 The pioneering book in this area was Morrison et al.’s Breaking the Glass Ceiling. The book brought the term 
“glass ceiling” into the lexicon in 1987.  
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of the countries that has the most participation of women in top management. Nevertheless, 
the large proportion of women on the firm’s board of directors might be due to the quota 
mandated in December 2005 rather than women’s efforts to break the glass ceiling by their 
own forces. In such a situation, when women are being promoted just because the company 
has to comply with the law, then women’s strengths may go unrecognized and silence may 
lead to the obsolete belief that women bring nothing new to the table. Conversely, some 
directors may become what sociologists call the “Queen Bee”: they take advantage of their 
token status posing as the single representative in their collectivity as they excessively 
criticize their potential women peers.  
This paper contributes to the economic literature on gender and top management by 
attempting to solve the chicken-and-egg problem – do women change their working 
environment after reaching the highest level in corporate promotion, or do women reach to the 
top of the pyramid because they work in an environment that is already favourable to them? 
In other words, is firm performance dependant on the CEO gender or is the CEO gender 
dependent on firm characteristics?  
Since the mid-1980s, advocated for women have worked hard to convince the business 
world that women are as capable as men in high executive positions. Therefore, their 
inclusion in the executive suite contributes to the goodwill of the company (Adler). Adler’s 
study brings evidence that 215 Fortune 500 firms (from 1980 to 1998) show a strong 
correlation between promoting women into the executive suite and high profitability. Under 
three measurements of performance (profits as a percentage of revenues, profits as a 
percentage of assets, and profits as a percentage of stockholder’s equity), Adler’s study 
proved that firms that had women in the executive suite had better results than the other firms.  
However, another related study from 1999, shows that there had been no progress with 
respect to women as CEOs from 1987 to 1996, and there was no evidence that such progress 
would likely be forthcoming in the future (Daily 1999, 96-97).  
I will investigate whether there has been a progress in this regard by examining all 
Norwegian firms over the past decade. In order to be more accurate, I will use three sub-
samples: AS, ASA and listed firms. A specific aspect that I will take into account is the 
Norwegian quota obliging all PLC companies to have 40% females on the board of directors. 
The government mandated the quota in 2005. All PLCs registered after 1st January 2006 had 
to comply with the quota immediately. As for the other existing firms, they were give an 
interval of two years to meet the requirements of the law.  
GRA 1902 Preliminary Thesis Report 
 
- 6 - 
Therefore, I will examine if the quota mandated in December 2005 had an impact not 
only on board composition, but also on the executive suite. Are there more women CEOs after 
the quota was implemented? 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
 
Overview of Corporate Governance Literature 
 
Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997, 737). This refers to the agency problem often known as the separation of ownership and 
control or the separation of management and finance. According to the definition given on the 
Oslo Børs official website, corporate governance addresses the triangular interaction between 
a company's shareholders, board of directors and management. In a somewhat wider context, 
corporate governance also embraces the relationship between a company and parties other 
than shareholders, such as employees, creditors, the local community, and other parties with 
whom the company has a connection.2  
In Shleifer and Vishny’s paper (1997), A Survey of Corporate Governance, the authors 
are dealing with the separation of financing and management as they are trying to analyze 
how this dissociation is handled with both in theory and in practice. Various methods and 
suggestions are given so as investors recuperate the money from the managers. Whether 
incentive contracts are offered to the managers3, legal protection to the investors and even 
considering the concentration of ownership4 as a way of leveraging up legal protection, the 
managers of the companies should serve the interests of all shareholders and not only theirs.  
When dealing with concentration of ownership, it is debatable which part should own more 
(the state, the institutional, the personal, the industrial or the international owners) so as to 
emulate countries with good corporate governance systems such as those suggested by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) – United States, Germany, or Japan. Obviously, the type of 
governance system will strongly depend on which cultural and legal framework the 
companies employ. For instance, most of the studies on large ownership structure focus on the 
U.S and UK firms. The findings of Short and Keasey (1998) confirm that national culture and 
                                                 
2 In one word, stakeholders of the company. 
3 The forms of incentive contracts are: share ownership, stock options, and threat of dismissal if income is low 
(Berle and Means 1932 cited in Shleifer and Vishny 1997). In my paper, I will focus on share ownership.  
4 The forms of concentration are: large shareholders, takeovers, and large investors.  
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governance systems have a major influence on the inception point at which managerial 
entrenchment occurs. Thus, a wider examination on the relationship between firm value and 
managerial ownership across different countries might bring new insights.  
In the attempting of discovering which represents the best fit of management 
ownership so as to maximize the value of a firm, there have been made numerous researches 
in this field. One of the most eloquent is Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An 
Empirical Analysis (Mork et al. 1986). The paper uses a sample of 456 of the Fortune 500 U.S 
firms and investigates the relationship between management ownership and market valuation 
of the firm measured by Tobin’s Q. The results show a positive relationship between 
ownership and Q in the 0% to 5% board ownership range, a negative and less pronounced 
relation in the 5% to 25% range and a further positive relation beyond 25%. In a related and 
more up to date study, Bhabra et al. (2003) examines the curvilinear relationship between 
director’s equity ownership and firm performance in the Singapore economy. Firm value is 
also measured by Tobin’s Q, and the findings indicate that Q is positively related to director 
ownership in the 0% to 20.34% range, negatively related in the 20.34% to 52.73% range, and 
again positively related when directors’ ownership exceeds 52.73%. These inflection points 
are higher than the ones in Mork, Shleifer, and Vishny (1986) of U.S firms. In addition to the 
1986 study, the research in Singaporean firms analyzes this relationship among three sub-
samples: founder, government linked corporations, and corporate.  
In other connected research, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find a simple linear relation 
between profit rate (as an alternate measure of firm performance) and ownership by large 
shareholders, in contrast to Mork et al. (1986), who focus on ownership by management only. 
However, when estimating the relationship between the profit rate and board stake, Mork et 
al. (1986) get consistent results with the previous study from 1985. More refined results are 
obtained in later studies which capture a rather nonmonotonic relationship between profits 
and board ownership.  
 
Board Diversity and the Role of the CEO 
 
Although the present paper mainly considers the economic and finance literatures, 
boards and CEOs’ attributes have been a subject of interest in a wide range of domains: 
including accounting, management, law, sociology, and psychology. From the financial point 
of view, a deeper insight towards the board of the companies as well as a more detailed view 
upon its role and its relationship with the CEO of the company may offer new approaches of 
the agency problem (in the way that the CEOs’ incentives could be misaligned with those of 
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the shareholders’). It is often questioned what is the role exerted by the boards and to what 
extent does their role matter within a corporation. By performing a linear regression between 
financial performance and governance attribute (e.g., measured by board size) gives an 
apparent negative relation which could easily lead to the conclusion that a firm would do 
better if it diminished the size of the board. However, as the survey by Adams et al. (2010 a) 
shows this is not the case as for a given firm there is a nonmonotonic relation between the 
attribute and financial performance.  
In the Adams et al. (2010 b) survey on the role of board of directors in corporate 
governance, possible answers range from boards’ being simply legal necessities, something 
akin to the wearing of wings in English courts, to their playing an active part in the overall 
management and control of the corporation. Other possible roles might be: setting the 
strategic direction of the company, the corporate policies, the overall direction, mission and 
vision (Demb and Neubauer 1992 cited by Adams et al. 2010). Another important role 
ascribed to directors is control of the process by which top executives are hired, promoted, 
assessed and, sometimes, even fired. Even though it would be at least challenging to analyze 
the structure of the board and correlate it with firm performance and with other efficiency 
indicators, the present paper is describing the relationship of the CEO with the board and how 
the CEO’s attributes influence the firm’s performance.  
A CEO which has a good performance can win on two sides: he might bargain for 
more compensation and he might also bargain on the degree of the board’s independence 
because it is assumed he would rather prefer to remain CEO than be fired. An interesting 
aspect worth dwelling upon is observing the evolution of the CEO’s salary in parallel with 
board independence and monitoring by the board. An increase in the CEO’s salary signals that 
the board is more willing to budge on the issue of independence (willingness to monitor) than 
salary; hence, there is movement on independence (Adams et al. 2010 c). In addition, a CEO 
who performs well faces a less independent board, whereas a CEO who performs poorly is 
susceptible to being fired or replaced. As a conclusion, measures of CEO bargaining power, 
tenure and the CEO’s share are negatively correlated with board independence. Adams’s 
(2010 d) results are in accordance with Ryan and Wiggins’s (2004) findings that show that a 
CEO’s pay becomes less linked to equity performance as his control over the board increases 
(proxied by his tenure and proportion of insiders). These results are similar to the ones 
obtained by Babchuk, Cremers and Peyer (2010) who found that higher CPS5 is associated 
                                                 
5 CPS (CEO Pay Slice) is the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the firm’s top-five executive team 
captured by the CEO (Adams, Almeida and Ferreira, 2005 b).  
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with lower firm value, lower accountability, profitability, and lower stock market returns 
accompanying the filling of proxy statements for periods where CPS increases.  
Nevertheless, in the organizational literature, there is some controversy whether top 
executives matter. It is debatable whether the CEO exercises power over firm profitability. 
Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Bertrand and Schoar (2003) cited by Adams, Almeida and 
Ferreira (2005, 1405 a) found some characteristics of top executives that are related to firm 
outcomes. These characteristics, often being the source of diversity, are of two categories: 
observable ones, which are readily detectable attributes of directors, and less visible ones, 
such as background of directors (Miliken and Martins 196 cited by Kang et al. 2007 a). On 
one hand, the observable diversity category includes race ethnic background, nationality, 
gender and age. On the other hand, the less observable diversity category comprises 
educational, functional and occupational backgrounds, industry experience, and 
organizational ownership.  
 
Gender Diversity and The Norwegian Quota 
 
In my paper, I analyze the observable category of characteristics with focus upon 
gender. Gender is one of the most discussed diversity issue not only within corporations, but 
also in politics. Along the years there have been various quota systems aimed to raising 
representation of women both in government structures6, and also on boards. The most 
eloquent example is the coalition of the Norwegian government in 2002 who asked companies 
to comply with a new quota that all public limited liability companies should make their 
boards be comprised of 40% female7. The quota was mandated on 9th December 2005 and 
was only addressed to limited liability companies. The deadline for meeting the new 
regulation was 2008 and the sanction for non-compliance was firm liquidation (Nygaard 
2011). Therefore, according to the Norwegian Business Register, by 2008 all PLCs were in 
accordance with the law. However, some firms succeeded in evading the law by conversing 
from PLC to LTD. Results from the abovementioned paper suggest that, indeed, the 
conversion rate is associated with the quota. However, for the non-listed PLCs results show 
that there is a strong negative correlation between the conversion decision and the share 
                                                 
6 Gender quotas exist for political parties in countries such as France and Sweden.  
7 A weaker imitation of the law passed by the Norwegian government is the Spanish government’s Gender 
Equality Act (Ley de Igualidad) in March 2007. The law requires that 40 % of candidates on political party 
ballots should be female, and it encourages greater employment of women by giving companies with greater 
ratio of female to male employees preferential treatment when bidding for government contracts. It also 
recommends, but does not require firms negotiating for public contracts to have at least 40 % of the least 
represented gender on their boards by 2015 (Miguez and Martin). 
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female directors in both 2006 and 2007. This is consistent with the fact that the quota only 
had an impact after it was mandated in December 2005.  
A similar study examines the differences in firm performance measured by profit 
among both listed and non-listed Norwegian firms. Matsa an Miller (2011) proved that the 
impact of the quota is negative, indicating that annual profits decreased: profits declined after 
2006 by 2.7 % of assets among listed firms relative to the change in profits in unlisted firms 
during the same time period.  
I will investigate whether the quota introduced in Norway had an indirect impact on 
the CEOs of the PLC companies and whether the quota had substantially increased the overall 
aggregated fraction held by female owners within the same type of Norwegian firms. 
Moreover, I will examine if there is a significant association between the gender of the CEO 
and financial performance measured by ROA and ROE for all Norwegian firms.  
Using a sample of 200 large U.S firms, Shrader et al. (1997) did not find any 
significant relationship between the percentage of women in the upper management and firm 
performance. In 2009, Adams and Ferreira studied a sample of firms from 1996-2003 and 
found a negative relationship between gender diversity and both ROA and Tobin’s Q. In 
another study of 250 listed companies from 200-2006, Hussein and Kiwia (2009) found no 
relationship between female board representation and Tobin’s Q. In Canadian firms, 
Francoeur, Labelle, and Sinclair-Desgagne found a positive correlation between female 
officers and financial performance, but no relationship between women directors and 
performance. However, Adler’s (2011) results are different from previous ones. He found that 
there is a strong correlation between women-friendliness and firm profitability. The sample in 
his study comprised of 25 Fortune 500 firms and showed a strong participation of women in 
executive slots.  
Adams and Ferreira’s results from the 2009 paper suggest that mandating gender 
quotas for directors can reduce ﬁrm value for well-governed ﬁrms. This result could occur 
because token8 members are often marginalized as representing the “women’s” or the 
“minority’s” point of view, as if it were a monolithic position (Rhode 2010, 18).  
Often, women regard quotas as rather pernicious for them. Imposing women by force 
could be in a way looking down on them. A specific quota for women could be interpreted as 
an underestimation of the women’s capability to move beyond the glass ceiling through merit, 
competence and courage (Martin 2007). An important paper on women representation in 
boards is Adams and Funk’s study from 2009. They surveyed CEOs of publicly traded 
                                                 
8 Tokenism is a formal or superficial compliance with a law, requirement, convention, especially in the hiring of 
members of a minority group. 
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Swedish firms and showed that female and male directors differ systematically in their core 
values and risk attitudes. Even though, in general, women are more risk averse than men, 
results of the survey show that female directors are more inclined to take risks than men.  
In the case that women directors are, indeed, more risk loving than men directors then 
one would expect a firm with more women on board to perform better. Performance is a broad 
term and includes not only profitability, but also risk. Markowitz marked these aspects when 
he first developed the Portfolio Selection Theory. Therefore, an investor will take more risk 
because he/she assumes to obtain more profitability and vice versa. Firms with less risky 
investment will have less profitability.  
Further research in a wide number of countries would facilitate a comparative study of 
the impact of institutional and cultural differences of diversity factors both on CEOs and 
boards of directors. For example, as far as gender is concerned, the Swedish corporate boards 
have 27.3 % female members, Finland has 24.5 %, Canada 10.3 %, and Denmark 13.9 %. By 
contrast, women occupy fewer than 10% of corporate seats in China (8.5 %), Mexico (6.8 %) 
and the Arab countries (Catalyst9, 2011).  
 
Women in the Executive Suite 
 
CEOs are in their majority male, and evidence from psychology shows that, ceteris 
paribus, men tend to be more favourably evaluated in roles occupied mainly by men. Women 
are less motivated to deviate from “masculine” behaviour when occupying such roles (Eagly 
and Johnson 1990). There is also evidence that the stock market reacts unfavourably to the 
hiring of a female CEO (Lee and James 2007). Therefore, what holds for female participation 
in top management below the CEO level may not hold for female CEOs. 
Even though there has been evidence showing that women participation in the 
boardroom is positively correlated with firm performance, having a female CEO is not 
systematically related to performance. This suggests that there may be something special 
about the CEO position that interferes with the effectiveness of female managers (Deszo 
2008).  
I will investigate whether the number of female directors is associated with having a 
woman director.  
                                                 
9 Catalyst is the leading research and advisory organization in North America which fosters the advancement of 
women in business.  
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An obvious question is: Are women making their firms perform better or have better 
performing firms been promoting women to senior positions? Are only the better performing 
firms using their female human capital at their best? 
Barnard (2006, 315-316) names the women who get to the top or near the top of their 
respective corporate pyramids the “Alpha Women”, and those who are CEOs, the “Elite”. 
Barnard’s survey on women who break the glass ceiling gives a different view on the 
circumstances under which women enter the executive sector. Women reach the top 
management especially when risk of failure is extremely high. This is consistent with Ryan 
and Haslam’s “edge-of-the-cliff” theory that occurs when women become the heads of 
troubled companies. Therefore, Ryan and Haslam hypothesised a particular scensrio: “Rather 
than the appointment of women eaders precipitating a drop in company performance, it is 
equally plausible that a company’s poor performance could be a trigger for the appointment of 
women to the board”. One eloquent example is Anne Mulcahy who was promoted to CEO of 
Xerox Corp in August 2001. According to Business Week (2004), the time Anne was 
promoted, the company was “in terrible shape” and “it looked like a lost cause”. What is 
remarkable about the story is that the company returned to profitability at the end of 2001. 
However, Anne Mulcahy is not the only women CEO who accomplished a corporate 
resurrection that seemed less likely at that moment in time. Mary Sammons - CEO of Rite Aid 
Corp., and Pat Russo – CEO of Lucent Technologies Inc. achieved a successful business 
turnaround when the companies were in precarious conditions.  
Over the years, researchers have tried to identify and essentialize women’s unique 
management skills. However, it is still not known enough about Alpha or Elite women: how 
they strived in their way of reaching the top, how they faced difficulties and how they kept 
their determination in the face of failure, the role of their family and peer support, the impact 
of money, of values, of chance, and timing. Whether women are effective as CEOs, and, if so, 
under what circumstances are questions that must await future research.  
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III. Data and Methodology 
 
III.1 CCGR Database 
 
According to the Centre for Corporate Governance Research’s (CCGR) website, its 
objective is to improve the insight into how the governance of firms influences the welfare of 
its stakeholders. CCGR pays special attention to the private industry in general and to non-
listed firms and family firms in particular. 
CCGR focuses on empirical research and primarily studies Norwegian firms. The 
projects often use data that are difficult to obtain in other countries (such as unusually detailed 
ownership data for listed firms and high-quality accounting data for non-listed firms) or that 
reflect institutional environments which are unique internationally (such as mandatory 
representation of employees and females on the board of directors). 
As of 2012, the CCGR database consists of six tables and has 16 years of accounting 
data on corporate governance from 1994 to 2010, 10 years of data on corporate governance 
from 2000 to 2010.  
In my study, I will use three sub samples - AS firms, ASA firms, and listed firms – to 
examine the relationship between firm performance and CEO gender. However, for the AS 
and all ASA non-listed firms, I will only take into account the independent companies. For the 
listed firms, I will also take into account group companies (subsidiaries and parent firms), but 
I will exclude banks as they have a different regulation system.  
Allmennaksjeselskap (literally "all men stock company"), or ASA, is the Norwegian 
term for a public limited company. "ASA" or "asa" is added to the company name of all 
Norwegian companies registered as Allmennaksjeselskap. 
The ASA differentiates from the Aksjeselskap or AS in that it has rules regulating its 
ownership. There cannot be any rules limiting the company's ownership to certain interests 
and an ASA must offer a public tender to purchase stock, either new stock or from existing 
owners if the company is converted from an AS. Norwegian companies listed on the Stock 
Exchange must be ASAs. Norwegian banks are also ASAs, but they are exempt from certain 
regulation, including ownership regulation.  
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III.2 Variables 
 
The variables used in the paper are outlined below: 
1. Share 
owned by 
CEO 
2. Board size 3. Is subsidiary 4. Industry codes 
5. CEO 
gender 
6. ROA 7. Organization 
type 
8. Company 
name  
9. CEO birth 
year 
10. Result for 
the year 
11. Is parent 12. Foundation 
year 
13. CEO salary 14. ROE 15. OSE Listed 
Status 
16. Number of 
female 
directors 
17. Is 
independent 
18. Revenue 19. Aggregated 
Fraction held by 
Female Owners 
20. Number of 
personal 
female owners 
 
Because different industries prefer to use different measures of profitability, I chose 
three measures of firm performance: Profit-to-sales ratio, ROE, and ROA.  
1. Profit-to-sales ratio shows how many cents of profit are earned on each 
euro of sales (Sutton 2004 a, 51). The ratio can be calculated using 
various measures of profit (in this particular case, I used the net profit) 
and it provides insight into a firm’s cost structure. 
2. The return on equity shows the profit the company generates in a period 
on the capital invested in by its owners (Sutton 2004 b, 52).  
Return on equity (ROE) = Net profit (to shareholders)/ Average shareholders’ 
equity 
3. Te rate of return on assets (or return on assets (ROA)) shows the profit 
the company generates in a period on th total assets employed by it 
(Sutton 2004 c, 53).  
Return on assets (ROA) = Operating profit/ Average total assets 
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III.3 Objectives and Hypotheses  
 
There is an association between firm performance and the gender of CEO with respect 
to firm characteristics. 
H1: Firm performance = f (CEO gender/ firm characteristics) 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between firm performance and 
CEO gender; 
H1: There is a statistically significant relationship between firm performance and CEO 
gender. 
ROA = a*CEO gender + Σcontrol variables (firm age, ln(sales)) 
ROE = a*CEO gender + Σcontrol variables (firm age, ln(sales)) 
Profit/Revenue = a*CEO gender + Σcontrol variables (firm age, ln(sales)) 
 
There is a direct relationship between CEO gender and firm characteristics.  
H2: CEOgender = f (firm characteristics) 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between CEO gender and firm 
performance; 
H1: There is a statistically significant relationship between CEO gender and firm 
performance. 
CEOgender = a*industry type + b*firm age + c*ln(sales) +d*board size 
Industry 1 (consumer services/products) 
Industry 2 (materials and industrials) 
Industry 3 (others) 
 
There is a link between the Norwegian quota and the number of female CEOs within 
the Norwegian listed companies. 
H3: Aggregated fraction held by female owners = a*CEOgender + b 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between the Norwegian quota and 
the number of female CEOs within the Norwegian listed companies; 
H1: There is a statistically significant relationship between the Norwegian quota and 
the number of female CEOs within the Norwegian listed companies. 
Aggregated fraction held by female owners = a*CEOgender + b 
Number of female directors = a*CEO gender + b 
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There is a connection between firm performance and: CEO ownership, CEO salary, 
CEO gender, CEO age, and firm age.  
 
H4: ROA = a*CEO salary + b*CEO gender + c*CEO age + c*CEO ownership + d 
ROE = a*CEO salary + b*CEO gender + c*CEO age + c*CEO ownership + d 
Profit/Revenue = a*CEO salary + b*CEO gender + c*CEO age + c*CEO ownership 
+ d 
H0: There is no statistically significant relationship between firm performance and: 
CEO ownership, CEO salary, CEO gender, CEO age, and firm age;  
H1: There is a statistically significant relationship between firm performance and: 
CEO ownership, CEO salary, CEO gender, CEO age, and firm age.  
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